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Abstract
In this paper, we model the economy as a production network of competitive firms
that interact in a general-equilibrium setup. First, we find that, at the unique Wal-
rasian equilibrium, the profit of each active firm is proportional to (a suitable gener-
alization of) its Bonacich centrality. We also determine consumer welfare at equilib-
rium and characterize efficient networks. Then we proceed to conduct a broad range
of comparative-static analyses. These include the effect on profits and welfare of:
(a) distortions (e.g. tax/subsidies) imposed on the whole economy or specific firms;
(b) structural changes such as the addition of links and the elimination of nodes;
(c) productivity and preference changes.
We discover that the induced effects are in general nonmonotone, depend on global
network features, and impinge on each sector depending on the pattern of incentrali-
ties displayed by its input providers and output users. Furthermore, the inter-sector
“linkages” underlying these effects can usually be decomposed – following the heuris-
tic dichotomy proposed by Hirschman (1958) – into a forward (push) component and
a backward (pull) one. Finally, we undertake some preliminary analysis of firm dy-
namics and illustrate that, when evaluating policies of support and shock mitigation
from a dynamic viewpoint, the reliance on strict market-based criteria can be quite
misleading in terms of social welfare.
JEL: C67, D51, D85
Key words: Production, Networks, Distortions, Centrality, Profit
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1 Introduction
Any modern economy is a complex network of interfirm buyer-seller relationships that con-
stitute its production structure. There is a growing interest among economists in adopting
this network perspective to study a wide variety of economic phenomena: trade, interme-
diation, innovation, technological diffusion, learning, or the transmission of shocks. This,
of course, has prominent precursors in the celebrated work of John von Neumann, Wassily
Leontief or Albert O. Hirschman, all of whom stressed the importance of interindustry
relationships (or linkages) for a proper understanding of some of the key characteristics of
an economic system. In this tradition, the present paper proposes a general-equilibrium
model of the economy that, despite being standard in almost every respect, highlights the
network of interfirm relationships on its production side. In a nutshell, our objective is to
obtain a precise understanding of how the details of the production network topology (on
which no a priori restrictions are imposed) shapes profits, welfare, and the effects (static
and dynamic) induced by wide variety of changes and policy interventions.
In order to focus our analysis on the production structure of the economy, the demand
side is modeled through a representative consumer while the technology of each firm is
assumed of the Cobb-Douglas type. In general, however, each firm uses a diverse range of
inputs, whose productivities are individually specific. Under these conditions, our analysis
starts by showing that a unique equilibrium exists that displays a very sharp relationship
to the network structure of the economy. Specifically, we find that, at equilibrium, the
profitability of any given firm is proportional to its network centrality, as given by a
suitable generalization of the well-known measure of centrality proposed by Bonacich
(1987)1. On the other hand, we also determine the consumer’s welfare at equilibrium,
providing closed expressions for how it depends on the different parameters of the model
(in particular, the density and symmetry of the production structure).
Next, the paper turns to studying how the equilibrium is affected by a wide variety
of different changes in the environment. First, we consider the impact of distortions, for-
mulated in the idealized form of price wedges – either general ones that affect uniformly
the whole economy, or individual ones applying to single firms. Then, we turn our at-
tention to structural changes in the production network and consider both the effect of
global transformations that affect either connectivity or the number of nodes, as well as
local changes that affect only single nodes or individual links. We then close this part of
our analysis with a comparative study of supply-channeled changes (such as technological
improvements) with those that operate through variations in demand (e.g. a rise or fall
1For example, as compared to the received notion of Bonacich centrality that considers the paths of
different lengths that join any given pair of nodes, in our case only those that connect a firm node to
a consumption node are considered. The weight attributed to each of these paths reflects not only its
length (as in the standard Bonacich centrality, they are discounted by their respective length) but also
the relative importance that the consumer’s utility function attributes to the end good in question (while
in the standard notion all end nodes are given a uniform weight).
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in the consumer’s relative preference for a particular consumption good).
For all of the cases listed above, we provide formal expressions that capture the total
impact of the change in an explicit form. These expressions are conceptually quite simple
and should prove helpful in evaluating empirically alternative measures of economic policy.
Furthermore, many of them can be understood in a quite parallel fashion, in that they
involve a similar integration of constituent effects. Thus, on the one hand, they can be
regarded as consisting of a first-order impact on the immediate agent experiencing the
change (e.g. the firm subject to an individual tax or subsidy), followed by a spread of
such a first-order impact throughout the whole network as captured by a suitable matrix
of incentralities. On the other hand, the impact of many of those changes can also be
decomposed in terms of a push effect that operates downstream and a pull effect that
does so upstream. This dichotomy is reminiscent of the distinction between forward and
backward linkages often considered in policy analysis and notably proposed by Hirschman
(1958). Here we show how to distinguish precisely between them and also compare their
implications: while forward linkages induce resource reallocation downstream but have
no effect on profits, revenues, or input demands because of the entailed adjustment of
prices, backward linkages alter significantly all those variables – i.e, not only prices but
also revenues, profits, and input demands.
The analysis advanced so far is inherently static, i.e. it compares how different changes
in the parameters of the model affect equilibrium magnitudes. By building on it, however,
we can also address some genuinely dynamic issues. In this paper, we simply outline the
problem, leaving for future work an exhaustive study of it. We consider, specifically, the
problem of how to guide the distribution of firm support when, in the absence of it, some
incumbent firms may go bankrupt and disappear. The key dynamic concern here is that,
when several firms are at stake and not all can be supported, what particular firms are
chosen may lead to subsequent effects that are drastically different. For, as one firm is
protected but other fails, the latter may generate a cascade of ensuing failures that has
major longer-run effects. The question then is: what is the best criterion to use if the
objective is to minimize the overall (intertemporal) impact? In particular, we may ask:
are current prices and induced profits the right market signal? In brief, the answer we
provide is that, in some cases, profitability may by itself be a very misleading criterion
and that other network-based criteria (embodying considerations of intercentrality) will,
in general, be much more appropriate.
We end this short introduction with a brief review of related literature. From a
methodological viewpoint, our approach is close to recent work by Acemoglu et al. (2012)
who, building upon a Cobb-Douglas model proposed by Long and Plosser (1983), study
how/whether microeconomic shocks on individual agents or sectors may aggregate into
generating significant aggregate effects at the macroscopic level. Previous papers by
Horvath (1998), Gabaix (2011) are motivated by a similar concern. As already explained,
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our objective in this paper is very different and so are some of the key assumptions
and questions asked. Thus, just to mention one significant difference, we do not make
the assumption of constant returns in production since we are interested in how profit
performance is affected by network structure. Besides, our analysis focuses on the effect
of distortions, structural changes, or different kinds of demand and support policies rather
than the spread of shocks, which are very different kind of phenomena.
Our work is also related to Jones (2011) who, building as well on the framework
introduced by Long and Plosser (1983), studies how misallocation at the sector level
affects GDP. More generally, our paper relates to the vast literature that has attempted
to understand the intersectorial basis of economic development and the sectorial) policies
that can mitigate either misallocation or/and coordination problems. The workhorse in
this literature has been the input-output methodology originally formulated by Leontief
(1936), which has spawned a huge body of work, both theoretical and empirical (see e.g.
the monograph Miller and Blair (2009) for a recent account). Early on, building upon
this rise of input-output analysis, the influential work of Hirschman (1958) highlighted the
importance of some of the notions (e.g. forward and backward linkages) that will help us
understand key forces underlying our model. In contrast with the traditional input-output
literature, Hirschman’s approach emphasizes unbalanced growth rather than equilibrium
as the primary tool of dynamic analysis. To adopt such a perspective is also our eventual
objective, even though in the present paper our analysis is still mostly static.
However, the preliminary dynamic analysis of evolutionary market forces undertaken
in the last part of the paper (cf. the summary above) embodies some of the considerations
implicitly highlighted by Hirschman’s work. It also hints at the role that network-based
processes of propagation – e.g. of default through failure cascades – should have in a
proper assessment of economic policy in a complex interconnected economy. This, in turn,
leads us to the rich and diverse literature on contagion – for example, financial contagion
– that has experienced a significant impetus in recent years (see the recent Handbook
edited by Bramoulle et al. (2016) and the recent interesting work by Baqaee (2015) on
the specific context of production networks). A different, and complementary, aspect in
the dynamic study of economic networks concerns the processes of endogenous (payoff-
guided) network formation. The network-formation literature is still in too-preliminary a
state to provide much help in this endeavor. Our analysis of how certain structural changes
on nodes and links affect agents’ payoffs is a very preliminary step in this direction. The
recent paper by Oberfield (2012) studies a stylized version of the problem where agents
endogenously select their production techniques, conceived as links that connect them to
a unique supplier.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. First, in Section 2 we present the bench-
mark model, followed in Section 3 by the introduction of a collection of basic results.
These results include, specifically, an account of how the topological features of the pro-
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duction network shape the corresponding outcomes (i.e. profits of the firms and utility of
the consumer). Then, in Section 4 we study how different kinds of distortions (uniform
or firm-specific) affect the allocation of resources and relative firm performance. In Sec-
tion 5 we investigate how does the global structure of production network determine the
production and the welfare potential of the economy and how local perturbations in the
network structure impinge on the equilibrium outcomes. Section 6 discusses the influ-
ential push-pull dichotomy stressed by Hirschman (1958) through the lens of our model.
In Section 7 we provide a preliminary exploration of issues pertaining to firm dynamics
and point out that market signals can be quite misleading from the point of the long run
welfare. We summarize our contribution and conclude in Section 8.
In Appendix A we include the formal proofs of our main results. Then, in the (on-
line) Appendix B, we present the general case with unrestricted heterogeneity, while in
Appendix C (also available online) we revisit the comparative-statics analysis on firm
distortions when the system is closed and thus the monetary flows involved must be
balanced.
2 Benchmark model
We model an economy consisting of a finite set of firms N = {1, 2, ..., n} and a single
representative consumer. Our focus, therefore, is on the interfirm production relationships
– i.e. the production network – through which the economy eventually delivers the net
amounts of consumption goods enjoyed by the consumer. In principle, we allow that any
specific good may be consumed, used as an intermediate input in the production of some
other good, or display both roles simultaneously.
The goods that provide some utility to the consumer are labeled consumption goods,
and are included in the set M ⊂ N , with m = |M | and c = (c1, c2, ..., cm) representing
a typical consumption bundle. For simplicity, leisure is not in the set M and thus yields
no utility. Thus the consumer’s endowment of labor (which is normalized to unity) will
be inelastically supplied by the consumer and hence only has an instrumental role as a
source of income. The consumer’s preferences over consumption bundles are represented
by a Cobb-Douglas utility function U(·) of the form
U(c) =
m∏
i=1
cγii (1)
where each γi represents the weight that the consumer’s preferences attributes to con-
sumption good i.
Concerning production, we assume that there is a one-to-one correspondence between
firms and goods (thus, in particular, we rule out joint production).2 The production of
2Conceptually, we can think of each good as a “sector” consisting of many identical firms. Thus, from
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each good k takes place under decreasing returns to scale, and requires both labor and
intermediate produced inputs. The set of intermediate inputs that firm k uses in its
production is denoted by N+k , with nk = |N+k |. Let lk stand for the amount of labor used
in the production of good k and let (zjk)j∈N+k be the associated amount of intermediate
goods. Then the amount yk of good k produced by the homonymous firm is determined
by the production function fk : Rnk × R → R which is taken to display the following
Cobb-Douglas form:
yk = fk
(
(zjk)j∈N+k ; lk
)
= Akl
βk
k
 ∏
j∈N+k
z
gjk
jk

αk
(2)
where the vector (gjk)k∈N reflects the intensity (assumed positive)
3 with which firm k
uses/requires its different inputs, and αk > 0 and βk > 0 are the output elasticities of
labor and intermediate inputs.4
It is convenient to view the intensities gjk of input use as reflecting relative magnitudes,
so unless mentioned otherwise we shall normalize the corresponding vector to satisfy∑
j∈N gjk = 1 – in other words, we assume that the matrix G is column-stochastic. On
the other hand, we assume that the production technologies exhibit decreasing returns,
hence we posit that αk + βk < 1. It is worth noting that the model allows for full
heterogeneity across firms k ∈ N , not only in their pattern of input use (gjk)k∈N but
also in their production elasticities αk and βk. The latter heterogeneity, however, does
not raise particularly interesting issues and, therefore, for the sake of formal simplicity,
in the main text we shall focus throughout on the case where αk = α and βk = β for
some common values α and β. A detailed analysis for the fully heterogeneous case may
be found in the online Appendix B.
It is common in economic models to posit that more advanced technologies employ a
wider range of intermediate inputs, this being conceived as a reflection of higher “produc-
tion complexity.” Here we choose to formalize this idea in the way suggested by Benassy
(1998) (see also Acemoglu et al. (2007)), setting the pre-factor of the production function
as
Ak = n
α+ν
k (3)
with α + ν > 0. With this formulation, it is easy to see that a positive value of the
this perspective, what our model describes is the behavior of a typical firm in its corresponding sector, all
firms belonging to a given sector producing perfectly substitute goods. This, of course, is a classical way
of rationalizing, and providing foundations for, competitive behavior in equilibrium, as postulated below
(see also Definition 2 in Appendix A).
3If gjk = 0 for some input j used in the production of a certain good k, such an input is neither useful
nor required in k’s production. Therefore, it might as well be ignored altogether and the corresponding
link jk eliminated from the production network.
4This formulation implies that labor and all intermediate inputs in N+k are essential in production.
When the production technology of N+k = ∅, we interpret
∏
j∈N+
k
z
gjk
jk ≡ 1, thus no production is possible
because we then have Ak = 0 (see below for details).
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parameter ν corresponds to the case where a wider input range enhances productivity,
while a negative value reflects the opposite situation.5
The inputs j ∈ N+k used in the production of good k can be viewed as the in-neighbors
of node k in the production directed network Γ = {N,L}, where the set N of its vertices
is identified with the set of firms and there is a directed edge (i, j) ∈ L whenever j uses
good i as an input, i.e. iff gji > 0. This is a discrete (binary) network that only provides a
qualitative account of the production structure of the economy. A full-fledged description
of this structure is provided by the matrix of production intensities G = (gij)i,j∈N , which
in turn can be regarded as the adjacency matrix of the directed weighted network that
describes completely the production structure. The matrix G, together with the elasticity
parameters α and β, and the utility function U(·) of the representative consumer jointly
provide a full description of the economy. To study its performance we shall focus on
the standard notion of Walrasian (or Competitive) Equilibrium (WE), which consists of
a collection of prices and quantities that satisfy the usual optimality and market clearing
conditions. More precisely, a WE is an array [(p∗, w∗), (c∗,y∗,Z∗, l∗)] such that the
following conditions hold:
1. The consumption plan c∗ = (c∗1, c∗2, ..., c∗m) maximizes U(c) subject to the budget
constraint given by the wage and profit income the consumer earns.
2. The production plans given by the outputs y = (y∗1, y∗2, ..., y∗n), the demands for
produced inputs Z∗ = (z∗ij)i,j∈N , and the labor demands l
∗ = (l∗1, l∗2, ..., l∗n) are all
technologically feasible and maximize, for each firm i ∈ N , its respective profit.
3. The labor market and the markets for produced goods clear (i.e. supply equals
demand).
A rigorous formalization of WE is provided by Definition 2 in Appendix A. Since
the economy satisfies the usual properties contemplated by General Equilibrium Theory,
existence of a WE readily follows.
3 Basic results
The form of the production function (2) has the implication that (provided α and β are
both positive) labor and at least one intermediate input are essential in the production of
any good. No firm, therefore, can be active (i.e. achieve a positive production) unless it
5To understand this heuristically, suppose that firm k has a total amount of money M to spend
among nk intermediate inputs used in the production of good k. Then, if each input enters production
symmetrically and also bears the same price, firm k should split M equally among the nk inputs. Fixing
the amount of labor used, this implies that production must be proportional to nα+νk M
α
(
1
nk
)α
= nνkM
α.
Thus, if ν > 0 there are benefits from increasing the range of inputs used in production, and the magnitude
of ν quantifies precisely this effect.
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relies on some other active firm. This imposes a natural requirement of “systemic balance”
on an economic system if all its firms are to be active. And such a condition not only has
static implications but, as we shall see in Section 7, it entails dynamic consequences as
well. Similar considerations have been found to be important in the evolution of many
other systems – biological, ecological, or chemical – where some suitable notion of systemic
balance is also key to its static stability and dynamic evolution.6
However, an important feature of economic systems that has no clear counterpart in
other contexts is that, in a market economy, the “source of value” is not just internal
to the production network but, crucially, is also “externally” dependent on consumers’
preferences. Preferences provide the standard to measure welfare and also determine the
market value that shapes firm performance. To discuss this issue, it is useful to extend
the directed production network Γ = {N,L} with an additional node c that stands for
our representative consumer. This node c has an in-link (j, c) originating in every node
j ∈M that produces a consumption good. Such an extended network is denoted by Γˆ.
As a preliminary step in our analysis, we want to understand when, given a particular
(extended) production structure Γˆ, a particular firm i can be active at a WE. To this end,
we rely on the notion of Strongly-Connected Component (SCC). Let the notation j  k
indicate that there is a directed path originating in j and ending in k. Then, a subset
of nodes Q ⊂ N is said to be a SCC if, from every pair of nodes j, k ∈ Q, j  k. The
following result specifies necessary conditions for some particular node to be active at a
WE.
Proposition 1
Consider any firm i ∈ N that is active at some WE. Then we have:
(a) ∃Q ⊂ N that defines a SCC of the (extended) directed network Γˆ s.t. ∀j ∈ Q, j  i;
(b) i c.
Proof. See Appendix A.
A simple illustration of the necessary conditions contemplated in Proposition 1 is
provided by the production network shown in Figure 1. First we note that in this network
the four firms/nodes coded in red – i.e. 1 to 4 – do not satisfy the necessary conditions
(a)-(b) specified in Proposition 1 and thus cannot be active at any WE. The violation of
these conditions occur because either they do not have any intermediate input to rely on
(Firm 4) or there is no direct or indirect connection to the consumer node (Firms 1 to 3).
In the first case, the issue is one of feasibility (production of good 4 is not at all possible),
while in the second case the problem is one of incentives (if the goods were produced,
they would fetch no market value and hence lead to a zero profit).
In contrast, the remaining blue nodes 5-11 satisfy the aforementioned conditions and,
6See, for example, the interesting work of Jain and Krishna (1998), who stress the importance of
“autocatalytic balance” (the analogue of what we have called systemic balance above) in processes of
growth in biological systems.
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in principle, could be active at a WE. For nodes 5-7 this follows from the following two-fold
observation: they define a SCC (so they jointly define a feasible production structure), and
they also have an (indirect) connection to the consumer node (hence they may contribute
to market value). Instead, firms 8 to 11 do not form part of a SCC, and thus have to
depend on “external inputs” to undertake production. They can, however, obtain those
inputs from the aforementioned SCC and then access market value through firm 11, which
is connected to consumer node c (i.e. produces a consumer good).
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
C
Figure 1: An extended production network Gˆ that includes the consumer node. The blue
nodes are those that satisfy conditions (a)-(b) in Proposition 1, while the red ones do not.
The green node represents the consumer demand.
Next, we address the question of whether there are conditions (possibly more stringent
than those specified in Proposition 1) that are not only necessary but also sufficient, i.e.
characterize when a firm is active at a WE. Building upon the ideas underlying Proposition
1 and the Cobb-Douglas specification of the model, we arrive at the following result.
Corollary 1
Consider any given firm i ∈ N . This firm is active at any WE if, and only if, it satisfies
(a) and (b) in Proposition 1 and so happens as well for all other firms j ∈ N+i providing
inputs to it.7
Proof. See Appendix A.
In view of the previous result, throughout this paper we shall assume that all existing
firms satisfy (a)-(b). For short, this will be labeled Condition (A). Clearly, this condition
can be assumed without loss of generality, for any other firm can be simply ignored in the
analysis.
7Note that, clearly, if a good i satisfies (b) in Proposition 1, then all its inputs satisfy it as well. Hence
the only relevant requirement concerning i’s inputs is that they be supported from the production side,
i.e. that they satisfy (a).
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Of course, the identification of what firms are active at a WE provides only a very
partial description of the situation. In general, there will be a wide heterogeneity in
performance across firms (specifically, in terms of sales and profits). And if firms are
symmetric in every respect except for their network position, it is the overall topology of
the production network that should be used to explain such heterogeneity. Can we map
the network-performance relationship in a sharp and insightful manner? To answer this
question we turn to our first main result of the paper, Proposition 2 below.
Proposition 2
There exists a unique WE for which the vector of equilibrium revenues s∗ = (s∗i )
n
i=1 ≡
(p∗i · y∗i )ni=1 is given by
s∗ =
w∗(1− α)
β
(I − αG)−1γ (i = 1, 2, ..., n),
while the corresponding equilibrium profits pi∗ = (pi∗i )
n
i=1 = (1− α− β)s∗.
Corollary 2
Assume M = N (i.e. all goods are consumed). Then, the relative revenues and profits of
the different firms at the WE satisfy:(
s∗i∑n
j=1 s
∗
j
)n
i=1
=
(
pi∗i∑n
j=1 pi
∗
j
)n
i=1
= (1− α)(I − αG)−1γ.
Proofs. See Appendix A.
Proposition 2 establishes that – under the maintained condition (A) – the unique WE
induces an equilibrium revenue (as well as profit) for each firm i that is proportional to a
suitable measure of network centrality of this firm given by (I − αG)−1γ. As we explain
next, this centrality notion integrates two main factors:
(i) the utility weight of each of the consumption goods whose production the firm’s
output contributes to, either directly or/and indirectly;
(ii) a weighted discounted measure of the direct and indirect ways in which the afore-
mentioned contribution takes place.
The measure of network centrality that arises from our analysis is a variation of the
widely-used concept of Bonacich centrality. Since this notion of centrality is defined in
the literature in slightly different forms, let us start our discussion by introducing the
particular version to which we are referring here.
Definition 1
Consider a directed weighted network whose adjacency (n×n)-matrix is G. Let δ ∈ (0, 1)
be a discount factor and ζ > 0 a scale factor. Then, the associated vector of Bonacich
centralities is given by v(G, δ, ζ) = ζ(I − δG)−11, where 1 is a suitable column vector
whose components are all equal to 1.
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To understand intuitively the notion of Bonacich centrality,8 suppose first that the
network is binary, so that links either have a zero or unit weight, i.e. gij ∈ {0, 1} for every
i, j ∈ N . Then, since the matrix G is assumed column-stochastic, its different columns
have to include exactly one unit entry and the other entries must be equal to zero. In
this simplified case, it is easy to show that the centrality of a particular node i can be
interpreted as (is proportional to) the average of the discounted number of paths that start
at node i and reach all n nodes (including itself) in r steps (r = 1, 2, ...). The discount
factor used is δ ∈ (0, 1), and the total discount imposed on any given path is tailored to
its length, i.e. it is δr if its length is r. To see this, rewrite the expression for centrality
introduced in Definition 1 as follows:
v(G, δ, ζ) = (vi(G, δ, ζ))
n
i=1 = ζ
[ ∞∑
r=0
δrGr
]
1 (4)
so that, for each i ∈ N , its corresponding centrality is given by
vi(G, δ, ζ) = ζ
n∑
j=1
[ ∞∑
r=0
δrg
[r]
ij
]
where each g
[r]
ij represents the ij-th entry of the matrix G
r. The suggested interpretation
is then a consequence of the fact that g
[r]
ij simply counts the number of paths of exact
length r that start at node i and end at node j. As we have seen (cf. Proposition 2),
the discount factor to be used in our case is δ = α (where α is the output elasticity
of intermediate inputs). Therefore, it turns out to be convenient to have a scale factor
ζ = (1− α)/n. Since the matrix G (and therefore every power Gr) is column-stochastic,
this scaling amounts to normalizing the centrality vector v to lie in the n− 1 simplex, i.e.∑n
i=1 vi = 1.
More generally, when the matrix G is a general column-stochastic matrix with its
entries gij ∈ [0, 1], an analogous interpretation can be provided but the “number of
paths” must then be replaced by the “normalized intensity” that flows between pairs of
nodes for every possible path lengths. Applied to our production context, such intensity
simply corresponds to the product of the input-demand flows between any given firm i
and the firms j that use the former’s good as input, directly or indirectly.
The relationship between a firm’s performance and its Bonacich centrality is especially
stark in the context considered in Corollary 2. There we abstract from any asymmetry
associated to the consumption side: all produced goods are assumed to be consumption
goods and equivalent for the consumer, which implies that γ = 1n1. Then, this result es-
tablishes that the relative performance of firms is exclusively determined by their Bonacich
centrality in the production network for a discount factor δ = α and scale factor (1− α),
where recall that α is the production elasticity of intermediate inputs. In this sense, we
8The measure introduced in Bonacich (1987) is defined by the expression c(G, a, b) = b(I − αG)−1G1
while Ballester et al. (2006) use instead b(G, a) = (I−αG)−11 as the measure they call Bonacich centrality.
11
may say that, given this elasticity, the profitability of a firm is the reflection of purely
“topological” features of the production network.
In the general case where the vector of preferences γ is arbitrary and possibly M 6= N
(not all goods are necessarily consumption goods), matters must be correspondingly
adapted and the notion of centrality considered has to account for those asymmetries.
Then, the relevant measure of centrality associates to the paths that arrive to any par-
ticular node j the weight γj that the consumer attributes to the respective good in her
utility function (cf. Proposition 2). Thus, in particular, if good j is not a consumption
good, paths of any given length r that connect some node i to such a node j do not
contribute directly to the centrality (and therefore the profitability) of firm i. They may
only do so indirectly to the extent that such paths can be constituent subpaths of longer
ones that eventually connect i to some consumption good k (in which case they would be
weighted by γk and affected by a lower discount factor).
Having characterized the situation on the production side of the economy, now we turn
to studying its consumption side. Specifically, our aim is to understand how the features
of the network impinge on the consumer’s welfare at the WE. Again we find that the
vector of centralities plays a prominent role, although in this case additional technological
parameters are also important. We start the analysis by providing an explicit expression
for the equilibrium utility in our next result.
Proposition 3
At the WE the consumer’s utility is given by
logU(c) =
n∑
i=1
γi log γi + log(1− α)α
α
1−α +
1
1− α(ν + α)∑
i
vi log ni − (1− α− β)
∑
i∈N
vi log vi + α
∑
i∈N
∑
j∈N+i
vigji log gji
 (5)
where recall that ni is the number of inputs used in the production of good i, ν is the param-
eter modulating the economies of scope through the factor Ai = n
α+ν
i , and v(G,α, 1−α) =
(vi)
n
i=1 is the corresponding vector of Bonacich centralities for δ = α and ζ = 1− α.
Proof. See Appendix A.
The previous result highlights the three endogenous magnitudes that shape welfare in
our context:
1. The weighted average (log-)connectivity,
∑
i vi log ni, where the degree of each
node/firm is weighted by its respective centrality.
2. A measure of heterogeneity/dispersion among firms, as reflected by the entropy of
their centralities, (−∑i∈N vi log vi).
3. The average heterogeneity/entropy in input use (i.e. −∑ gji log gji) displayed by
the technologies of the different firms i ∈ N , each of these individual magnitudes
weighted by the centrality of the respective firm i.
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4. The heterogeneity/entropy across goods,
∑n
i=1 γi log γi, displayed by the preferences
of the representative consumer.
Specifically, we find that consumer welfare is increasing in the average log-connectivity of
firms and in inter -firm symmetry, while it is decreasing in the intra-firm symmetry dis-
played by their technologies. These different magnitudes are aggregated through a simple
affine function whose coefficients are given by the underlying technological parameters.
Next, to obtain a sharper characterization of the situation, it is useful to reduce the
degrees of freedom by postulating the following two symmetry assumptions:
(S1) For any given firm i ∈ N , its different inputs play a symmetric role in its production
technology, i.e. gji = gki for all j, k ∈ N+i .
(S2) All goods are consumption goods and therefore γi = 1/n for every firm i ∈ N .
Under the previous conditions, the intra-firm heterogeneity of each firm i is dependent
on ni alone, i.e. on the number of inputs it uses (which, heuristically, could be under-
stood as the “complexity” of its production technology). Then, the expression in (5) is
substantially simplified, as stated by the following corollary.
Corollary 3
Assume (S1) and (S2) above. Then, the utility of the consumer at the WE is given by
logU = − log n+ log (1− α)α α1−α + 1
1− α
(
ν
n∑
i=1
vi log ni − (1− α− β)
n∑
i=1
vi log vi
)
(6)
Proof. See Appendix A.
Thus, under input symmetry, connectivity and inter-firm entropy are the sole considera-
tions that impinge on consumer’s welfare. As we shall discuss in Subsection 5.1, this stark
conclusion will allow us as well to obtain a similarly sharp assessment of what production
structures are welfare optimal in different technological scenarios.
4 Price distortions
In this section, we focus on the study of what could be interpreted as taxes, distortions, or
policy/price interventions of different sorts. An obvious, but still important, characteristic
of an interconnected economy is that any such distortion or intervention cannot be studied
just locally. In general, it is to be expected that its first-order impact could turn out to be
quite different from its overall effect on the economy, once the complete chain of indirect
effects is taken into account. Such a full-fledged analysis of the situation, however, can be
very complex and we need effective tools to carry out a proper analysis of the situation.
Here we provide a step in this direction.
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Specifically, in this section we consider two different cases. First, in Subsection 4.1, we
consider a price distortion that applies directly to all firms in the economy in a uniform
manner. Then, in Subsection 4.2, we turn to studying distortions that apply directly
to just one firm in the economy, so the effects on all others are only indirect. In both
cases, uniform or individualized, we focus on situations that, at an abstract level, can
be conceived as inducing “price wedges”. More concretely, this is an approach that can
taken to capture a variety of different cases: government policies that favor a particular
sector, ad-valorem taxes or subsidies, or the reflection of market power.9 To stress the
intended generality, we shall simply speak of them as distortions10.
A common idea that arises in the analysis of both uniform and individual distortion is
that centrality-based measures are key in determining the size and direction of the induced
effects. Centrality being an inherently global measure, the point is then that the impact
of any change or intervention, no matter how “local” it might appear, must be evaluated
globally. In fact, variants of the same general idea will reappear as well in much of the
analysis conducted throughout the paper, again an indication of the unavoidable global
nature of the issues being studied. In essence, the crucial network magnitudes involved
in the analysis will turn out to be what we shall call (bilateral) in- and out-centralities.
These are the elements of the matrix M = (mij)ni,j=1 ≡ (I − αG)−1 included in the
definition of (Bonacich) centrality – cf. Definition 1.
Specifically, for every pair of nodes i and j, the ij-incentrality is identified with mij .
By writing
vi(G,α, ζ) =
1− α
n
n∑
j=1
[ ∞∑
r=0
αrg
[r]
ij
]
=
1− α
n
n∑
j=1
mij (7)
it is indeed apparent that mij represents (or, more precisely, is proportional to) the
contribution of node j to the Bonacich centrality of i. Reciprocally, we refer to the entry
mji as the ij-outcentrality. Note that, within our general economic model (cf. Proposition
2), for each i ∈ N the entries mij (j = 1, 2, ..., n) are the weights given to the preference
weights γj of each good produced in the determination of the equilibrium profits of firm
i through the expression
pi∗i = (1− α− β)
w∗(1− α)
β
n∑
j=1
mijγj . (8)
Thus, as explained, the contribution to i’s centrality provided by an intermediate product
j that is not consumed (whose γj = 0) has no effect on i’s equilibrium profits.
9See, for example, the paper by Hsieh and Klenow (2009) or Jones (2011) for an elaboration on such
a general interpretation of price distortions.
10Within our framework one can also analyze input specific distortions (i.e. distortions that lower the
marginal product of one input relative to others, see (Hsieh and Klenow, 2009) for details) using the same
tools. We do not include analysis of this type of distortions in the paper. The details are available upon
request.
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4.1 Uniform price distortion
We start our analysis of distortionary effects by considering the implications of a uniform
price distortion τ imposed on all firms of the economy. Its effect is to draw a proportional
wedge between the price pi the consumer pays for each good i and the price (1 − τ)pi
received by the firm selling it. In principle, the value of τ might be negative, in which
case it could be interpreted, for example, as a subsidy (hence amounting to a proportional
increase in the revenue earned from the firm). An issue that arises here is whether the
monetary payments (or proceeds) entailed should be distributed back to (or subtracted
from) the revenue available to the agents of the economy – that is, whether the system is to
be conceived as closed to those monetary flows. In general, the answer must depend on the
specific interpretation attributed to those flows (e.g. on whether they are redistributive,
or purely distortionary and hence wasteful). Here, in the main text, we shall consider the
formally simpler case where they are a pure outflow (or inflow) of resources, while referring
the reader to the online Appendix C for a consideration of the alternative closed-system
version. None of our results are qualitatively affected by the scenario being considered.
Our first observation (see Lemma 1 in Appendix A for details) is that, under a uniform
τ applied to all goods of the economy, the expression that characterizes the vector of
equilibrium profits is generalized to
pi∗(τ) = (1− τ)(1− α− β)w(1− α)
β
(I − α(1− τ)G)−1 γ (9)
This readily implies that, as expected, the effect on equilibrium profits of an increase in
τ is unambiguously negative – the reason, of course, is simply that, in our context, any
distortion is always detrimental.11 Indeed, if we consider the marginal effect of increasing
τ , we find (see Lemma 2 in Appendix A):
dpi∗
dτ
(τ) = −(1− α− β)s∗(τ)− α(I − α(1− τ)G)−1Gpi∗(τ) < 0
where pi∗(τ) stands for the full vector of profits earned under τ by all firms.
Having settled the question of how a uniform distortion affects firms’ profits, next
we turn our attention to the much more complex issue of how it can diversely impinges
on the relative profits of the different firms, as a function of their individual position
in the network. To account for this relative performance in a convenient manner, it is
useful to focus on the normalized (equilibrium) profits (pˆij)
n
i=1 of each firm i obtained by
setting the nominal wage w(τ) so that
∑
j∈N pˆij = 1. A formal characterization of the
(marginal) implications of changing τ on the relative profit performance of the different
firms is provided by the following result.
Proposition 4
Given any given distortion τ ∈ [0, 1], let (pˆij(τ))i∈N be the corresponding profile of nor-
11An analogous conclusion obtains for the effect of τ on consumer’s welfare, which can be shown to be
always negative. Details are available upon request.
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malized equilibrium profits and denote (m˜ij(τ))
n
i,j=1 ≡ (I − α(1− τ)G)−1. The marginal
effects on profits induced by a change on τ are determined by the following system of
differential equations:
dpˆii
dτ
(τ) =
1
1− τ
n∑
j=1
m˜ij(τ) (γj − pˆij(τ)) (i = 1, 2, ..., n), (10)
and hence, at a situation with no distortion (τ = 0), the marginal impact of introducing
it is:
dpˆii
dτ
∣∣∣∣
τ=0
=
n∑
j=1
mij (γj − pˆij(0)) (i = 1, 2, ..., n), (11)
where recall that M = (mij)ni,j=1 is the matrix of incentralities.
Proof. See Appendix A.
The above result highlights that the firms most negatively affected in their relative
profit performance by the introduction of the distortion are those whose centrality is
heavily dependent on firms with high original profits. A particularly stark manifestation
of this idea is displayed in (11), which applies to the case where the distortion is just
being marginally introduced. This expression can be heuristically understood as follows.
The effect on the relative profit standing of any given firm changes as prescribed by an
average composition/multiplication of two magnitudes:
(a) the first-order impacts experienced by each one of the firms in the economy, whose
sign and size is captured for each firm j ∈ N by (γj − pˆij(0)) – a comparison of firm
j’s relative profit and the (relative) weight of its output in consumer’s preferences;
(b) the extent to which those impacts are transmitted to the firm i in question, as
captured by its respective vector of ij-incentralities (mij)
n
j=1.
When the base distortion is not zero but is some given τ > 0, this two-fold mechanism
exhibits the general form given by (10), which has an analogous interpretation. An in-
teresting feature of this expression is that the sensitivity of relative equilibrium profits to
interfirm asymmetries grows steeply as τ approaches unity. Another interesting consider-
ation worth highlighting is that, because the dependence of profits on τ is nonlinear, there
is the potential for complex (and, in particular, nonmonotonic) behavior as the distortion
changes within its full range [0, 1]. The following simple example illustrates that this is
indeed a possibility.
Example 1
Consider the simple production network with nine firms depicted in Figure 2, where it is
assumed that all firms produce a consumption good and hence the arrows only indicate
the flow of input use. Figure 3 traces the relative profits for possible values of τ ∈ [0, 1]
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and a subset of firms (for the sake of readability, not all firms are included). The second
diagram shows that, as τ grows (and, naturally, the profit spectrum across firms narrows)
there are rank changes in the relative position of some firms. Thus, while Firm 6 remains
the highest-profit firm throughout, as τ grows the position of Firm 8 deteriorates, from
second to fourth position. Indeed, we find that it is not just the ranking partially changes
but even the relative profit of an individual firm may evolve in nonmonotonic way as τ
rises. Specifically, as shown more clearly in Figure 4, this happens to Firm 1, whose profit
first grows and then decreases.
1
2
3
456
7
8
9
Figure 2: A simple production network illustrating the discussion included in Example 1.
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
τ
0.06
0.08
0.10
0.12
0.14
0.16
0.18
pi
Firm 1
Firm 5
Firm 6
Firm 7
Firm 8
Figure 3: The relative profits of all firms in the production network displayed in Figure 2
for all values of τ ∈ [0, 1].
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Figure 4: The nonmonotonic behavior of the relative profit of firm 1 in the production
network displayed in Figure 2, as τ changes in the range [0, 1].
4.2 Individual price distortion
In this subsection, our focus turns from a common distortion that affects uniformly all
firms to one that impinges only on a specific firm k. As shown in Appendix A, such
a firm-specific price distortion, denoted by τk, introduces just a simple modification in
the equilibrium expressions derived for the benchmark model, but one that is of a quite
different nature from those obtained for a uniform distortion. For example, in contrast
with (9), the induced equilibrium profits pi∗(τ ok ) = [pi
∗
i (τk)]
n
i=1 are now given by:
pi∗(τk) = (1− α− β)w
∗(1− α)
β
(
I − αGˆ(τk)
)−1
γ. (12)
where Gˆ represents a modified matrix that replaces the original one, G. These matrices
only differ in their respective kth columns, gˆk and gk, which satisfy gˆk = (1− τk)gk.
The difficulty lies in studying the inverse in (12) to obtain its dependence on τk. To
do this, it is useful to write the modified matrix Gˆ(τk) as follows:
Gˆ(τk) = G− τkgke′k, (13)
where e′k is the n-dimensional row vector that has a 1 in its kth position and 0 elsewhere.
This then allows us to rely on the following result in Linear Algebra (cf. Sherman and
Morrison (1949) or Hager (1989)):
Sherman-Morrison Formula. Let A be a nonsingular n-dimensional real matrix, and
c, d two real n-dimensional column vectors such that 1 + d′A−1c 6= 0. Then,
(A+ cd′)−1 = A−1 − A
−1cd′A−1
1 + d′A−1c
.
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Applying the above result to our case – with the particularization A = I −αG, c = τkgk,
and d = ek – we arrive at the following full characterization of how the k-specific distortion
affects equilibrium profits.
Proposition 5
Consider a distortion τk imposed on firm k and let (pi
∗
i (τk))
n
i=1 stand for the correspond-
ing equilibrium profits. The marginal effects on profits induced by a change on τk are
determined by the following system of differential equations:
dpi∗i
dτk
(τk) = −pi∗k(0)
mik
(1− τk(1−mkk))2
(14)
and hence, at a situation with no distortion (τk = 0), the marginal impact of introducing
it is:
dpi∗i
dτk
∣∣∣∣
τk=0
= −pi∗k(0)mik (i = 1, 2, ..., n), (15)
Proof. See Appendix A.
The previous result states that the profit decrease experienced by any firm i due to
the direct distortion impinging on another firm k depends on
• how profitable k was prior to the distortion;
• the importance of k in determining the centrality of i;
• how much of k’s centrality “feeds into” itself.
As intuition would suggest, while the first two considerations increases the profit loss on
firm i due to distortion on k, the last one decreases it (with the only exception considered
in (15) when there is no distortion to start with). Again we observe that incentralities
(as captured by the mik and mkk mentioned in the last two items) play a prominent role
in shaping the overall global effect. It is also interesting to observe from (14) that the
function mapping k’s distortion into i’s profit is convex so that, just as in the uniform-
distortion case, the marginal effect of increasing τk grows with the level of it. Another
feature that was noted for the previous uniform case is that the induced nonlinearities
can lead to somewhat paradoxical conclusions. This phenomenon arises as well here, as
illustrated below by through two examples.
Example 2
Consider the production network depicted in Figure 5, where the corresponding profile
of Bonacich centralities are also shown. Again, for simplicity, all produced goods are
assumed to be not only intermediate inputs but consumption goods as well. Firm 1 and
then Firm 2 are those with the highest centrality in the production network. Therefore,
under no distortion, they are also the firms enjoying the highest profits at the Walrasian
equilibrium.
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Figure 5: A production network in the upper panel, with the corresponding profile of
Bonacich centralities for each of the nodes displayed in the lower panel.
However, as shown in Figure 6, the situation can change in interesting ways if our
focus turns to relative profits (normalized to add up to one) and the distortion τ2 expe-
rienced by Firm 2 varies. (Note that here we are allowing τ2 to be negative, varying in
the range τ2 ∈ [−1, 1] and thus playing possibly the role of a subsidy.) For τ2 = 0 (no
distortion) the profit ranking exactly mimics that of centralities, as already explained. In
contrast, as τ2 grows and becomes positive, we observe the somewhat paradoxical fact that
the relative profit of Firm 2 monotonically grows and, eventually, if τ2 is high enough,
even surpasses that of Firm 1 and becomes the highest. The opposite state of affairs is
found if Firm 2 is subject to a negative τ2. Then, a higher absolute value for it induces
a lower profit for this firm, eventually leading it to fall below that of Firm 10. Why does
this happen? The reason is that, as the distortion varies, the effect of this change – which
is modulated by the various incentralities – impinges most strongly on the those firms i
whose i2-incentrality is highest, which then alters the relative position of Firm 2 in the
direction opposite to the change of τ2. A further illustration of this role of incentralities,
which is particularly simple and stark, is provided by our next example.
20
1.0 0.5 0.0 0.5 1.0
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Figure 6: The change in relative profits among the firms placed in the production network
depicted in Figure 5 as the distortion experienced by Firm 2 changes in the range [−1, 1].
Example 3
Suppose that ten firms are arranged into a ring production network with each firm i =
1, 2, ..., 10 using the good produced by Firm i−1 as the sole intermediate input and having
its produced good be the sole intermediate input in the production of Firm i+1 (of course,
indices 0 and 11 are interpreted as 10 and 1, respectively). As in the previous examples,
all produced goods are assumed to be valuable to the consumer. Consider now a distortion
experienced by Firm 1, τ1 ∈ [−1, 1].
1.0 0.5 0.0 0.5 1.0
τ1
0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
0.10
0.12
0.14
pi
i
Firm 1
Firm 4
Firm 6
Firm 8
Firm 10
Figure 7: The change in relative profits among the firms placed in a ring production
network of ten firms as the distortion experienced by Firm 1 changes in the range [−1, 1].
In such a ring network, the input links define the cycle 1→ 2→ 3→ ...→ 10→ 1.
Figure 7 depicts how the relative profits of firms change over the whole range of vari-
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ation of τ1. The most affected is Firm 10, either negatively if τ1 > 0 or positively if
τ1 < 0. The reason is that this firm is the one with the highest i1-incentrality. Following
it, the firm whose bilateral incentrality relative to 1 is the highest is Firm 9, and thus this
firm is the one which is the second most affected by changes in τ1, and so on along the
ring. In the end, we find that, indeed, the firm that is least affected is Firm 1, the firm
that is directly subject to the distortion. Of course, this stark conclusion is an artifact
of the extreme production network considered but should help clarify the key mechanism
underlying global effects in our context.
5 Network structure
In line with our core concern of understanding how economic structure affects perfor-
mance, here we undertake an analysis of the following issues. First, in Subsection 5.1,
we study what features of the production structure (e.g. whether it is more or less con-
nected, or its degree of heterogeneity) impinge on the production and welfare possibilities
attainable at equilibrium. Then, in Subsections 5.2 and 5.3, our focus turns to study-
ing the overall effect of single “local perturbations” affecting the production structure.
Specifically, we consider two of them: (i) the creation (or elimination) of a link ij; (ii) the
elimination of an existing node/firm, or the creation of a new one. As we shall explain,
these changes can be understood as reflecting alternative economic phenomena.
5.1 Optimal network structure
The structure of production networks can be studied along many different dimensions.
Here we show that, as far as its impact on (consumer) welfare is concerned, the internode
symmetry displayed by the network and its connectivity stand out as two key features.
To highlight their effect, it is useful to simplify the analysis by focusing on networks
that satisfy the assumptions (S1)-(S2) introduced at the end of Section 3. That is, we
postulate that (a) the inputs involved in the production of every good play a symmetric
role, and (b) all goods are consumption goods. We also suppose that the number of
goods in the economy is given, while postponing to Section 7 an analysis of what are the
welfare implications of a change in this feature of the economy. Under these conditions,
we can build upon the analysis undertaken in Section 3 to arrive readily at the following
conclusion.
Proposition 6
Assume (S.1)-(S.2) in Section 3. Then, the production structure that maximizes consumer
utility is a regular network (i.e. all firms have the same number of inputs). Furthermore,
if ν > 0 the optimal network is complete (i.e. for all i ∈ N, ni = |N+i | = n − 1),
while if ν < 0 the optimal network is a minimally connected regular network (for all
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i ∈ N,ni = 1).
Proof. See Appendix A.
The previous result follows from inspection of the expression determining equilibrium
utility in (6), as a function of the the parameters of the economy and the induced profile
of firm centralities. On the one hand, the last term of that expression calls for the
maximization of the entropy of the simplex-normalized vector of centrality profiles, as
given by −∑i∈N vi log vi. This maximization is attained when all nodes have the same
centrality, which in turn requires that the network be symmetric across nodes and hence
regular. Thus all firms must display the same “input complexity,” i.e. they should all use
the same number of inputs. Then, whether such common complexity should be maximal
or minimal sharply depends on the sign of the parameter ν in (3), which reflects the nature
of the “economies of input scope” in production. If ν > 0, complexity is beneficial and
hence the optimal production structure should be complete, i.e. all other goods should be
used in the production of every one of them. Instead, if ν < 0, the exact opposite applies
and the optimal production structure should display the minimum complexity consistent
with viability (cf. Corollary 2). That is, it should constitute a ring for example.
In principle, of course, it is far-fetched to entertain the possibility that the production
structure of the economy might be “designed.” Instead, it is more natural to conceive this
structure to be a reflection of a wide number of different forces (e.g. technological change
or any other modification of the underlying economic environment) whose magnitude and
direction can hardly be controlled. Therefore, the discussion in this subsection has to be
interpreted mostly as a conceptual exercise. That is, the objective is to gain some under-
standing of what features of the production structure of an economy have an important
impact on welfare. And, from this perspective, what Proposition 6 shows is that (abstract-
ing from some other considerations) two characteristics arise as key: symmetry across all
production processes and extreme exploitation/avoidance of all economies/diseconomies
of scope.
5.2 Link creation
In the remaining part of this section, we adopt a local perspective to the analysis of
changes in the production structure. First, in this subsection, we focus on the impact of
a change affecting a single link – for concreteness, we consider the case where the link is
created. A preliminary and immediate point to note is that if a link ij is formed, the firm
i that consequently sees an expansion in the uses of its output cannot have its relative
profits decrease. The reason is that its centrality cannot decrease by this change – clearly,
the set of paths that access consumer nodes can only grow.
The effect of the new link ij on other firms– in particular, the firm j whose range of
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inputs has increased – is in general ambiguous (see Example 4 below). It depends, for
example, on how the weights (gkj)k∈N+j are affected by the change. Among the different
possibilities one could contemplate in this respect, here we shall assume, for concreteness,
that the new matrix G˜ continues to be column stochastic. A possible interpretation of this
modeling choice is that the new link entails a new and full-fledged production technology
available to firm j that, if adopted by this firm, satisfies the same normalization condition
as all other technologies do. In a sense, we view it as embodying a mature new option
that can be selected by firm j as a coherent and balanced package.12
Proposition 7
Consider an initial production network with adjacency matrix G and suppose that a link
ij is added to it. Denote by G˜ the resulting adjacency matrix and let q = (qk)
n
k=1 ∈ Rn
(
∑
k∈N qk = 0) be the real vector that reflects the entailed adjustment across the two
adjacency matrices, i.e. their respective jth columns, (gkj)
n
k=1 and (g˜kj)
n
k=1, satisfy g˜kj =
gkj + qk for all k = 1, 2, ..., n with g˜ij = qi > 0. The change on equilibrium profits,
(∆pi∗k)
n
k=1, induced by the new link is given by:
∆pi∗k = αpi
∗
j
mki qi +
∑
`∈N+j mk` q`
1 + qimji + α
∑
`∈N+j mj` q`
, (16)
where pi∗j is the original profit of firm j under adjacency matrix G.
Proof. See Appendix A.
The previous result establishes that if a new link ij is added to the production network,
the effect on the equilibrium profit of any particular firm j is given by the composition of
two key factors:
• The profit originally obtained by the firm j that provides a new use to good i. Intu-
itively, this magnitude reflects the importance of firm j in providing the immediate
market value generated by the new link ij.
• The impact on the centrality of k of each of the inputs involved in the production of
j (including the new input i), as captured by the respective incentralities, mki and
(mk`)`∈N+j . Each of these incentralities is weighted by the factor q` that reflects the
adjustment made (positive or negative) when transforming the adjacency matrix G
into G˜.
Again, therefore, we can understand the changes resulting from the new link as consisting
of the composition of two kinds of effects: a first-order effect whose magnitude is associ-
12Admittedly, this is only one of the possibilities that could be reasonably considered. Alternatively, it
could be assumed that the components of the new (g˜kj)k∈N+j
sum up to some positive magnitude H 6= 1.
Then, one could still unit-normalize the corresponding j-th column of G˜ by adjusting the overall input
elasticity of firm j to the value α˜j = Hαj . None of these possible modeling variations would affect the
essential gist of our analysis.
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ated to the equilibrium-induced importance of the directly affected nodes; a second-order
effect that involves the transmission of the aforementioned first-order effect through the
full array of network-based interactions that are captured by the matrix of incentralities.
Example 4
As advanced, in this example we illustrate that the addition of a new link ij can deteriorate
the relative position of the firm whose input range is expanded by the new link. Consider
the production networks depicted in Figure 8, and suppose that the smaller network gives
rise to the larger one that includes the new link 1 → 4. Let us assume that all goods are
consumer goods and have an equal weight in the utility function of the consumer. Let
us also suppose that the new matrix G˜ displayed after the change continues being column
stochastic. Then, denoting by pˆi† and pˆi‡ the respective vectors of normalized profits for
the original and modified networks, we compute them to be as follows:
pˆi† =

0.1000
0.3265
0.2960
0.2775
 pˆi‡ =

0.1790
0.2863
0.2718
0.2630
 (17)
Thus one finds that firm 4 obtains a lower relative profit after the link 14 is added to the
original network. Why is this the case? The simple reason is that, as explained, centrality
(and hence profitability) is associated to the (discounted) value a product delivers to the
consumer, not to the value it allows other firms to attain. That is, profitability is gathered
downstream rather that upstream and, given architecture of the network in our example,
the discounted downstream “flow” gained by Firm 4 from the new link falls relative to that
of the other firms – in particular, that of Firm 1, whose centrality is sure to increase.
1
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Figure 8: Two different production networks, whose only difference concerns the existence,
or not, of the link from node 1 to node 4. All nodes/firms are supposed to produce a
consumption good with equal preference weights.
5.3 Node deletion
In this section, we study the alternative (local) change in the production structure given
by the addition or removal of a (single) node rather than those of a link. Now, for
concreteness, we focus our attention on the case where the change involves the removal
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of the node. This is, in fact, the kind of change that will be considered in Section 7 when
studying the chain implications of a process of node/firm bankruptcy and endogenous
removal.
Once more we must face the modeling question of how the setup is to be renormalized
when the network changes – in this case, the set of nodes. Now it concerns both the utility
and the production functions, all of which deliver a value of zero when any of its arguments
is equal to zero. For the utility function, the renormalization we choose to tackle the
problem is the natural one: we restrict its arguments to the range of consumer goods
which can actually be produced given the prevailing set of active firms. In Subsection 7.1,
we provide a specific motivation for this choice in a context where the number of firms
changes due to a process firm selection.
Concerning the renormalization to be implemented on the production functions when
there is a reduction in the inputs available, again for concreteness we choose one specific
option but other alternatives could be analogously considered. The alternative considered
is different from that adopted in Subsection 5.2, where the change involved an increase in
input use. As we now explain, this contrast is motivated by a different view on what is
the nature of the phenomenon underlying the situation in either case. Here we conceive
the disappearance of a node as a somewhat abrupt/unexpected event that requires some
short-run and hence partial adjustment. Thus, unlike what was suggested for the case of
link creation, we assume that the columns of the matrix G are not renormalized. Thus the
firms j that see one of its inputs vanish somehow adapts (for otherwise the indispensability
of all prior inputs would force it to a zero production) but in a partial manner. Along
with the point made in Footnote 12, we can interpret this as a downward shift in the
productivity in the overall use of the available intermediate inputs.13 Admittedly, one
should not expect real-world situations to be so markedly polar as suggested between the
increase and decrease in the use of preexisting inputs. The contrast, however, is plausible
and we find it useful to simplify the discussion of either case.
Before stating the main result from this subsection, let us introduce following notation.
Let G˜ denote the resulting adjacency matrix after deletion of node i. If the deleted firm
produced a consumption good, then after deletion of that node one may expect that
weights γ that the consumer’s preferences attribute to all remaining goods will adjust14.
Let γ˜ denote the vector of resulting preference weights after a node is deleted.
In view of the relationship established between profitability and centrality, it is quite
clear that the elimination of a node can only be detrimental to the profits of all firms in
the economy. A precise specification of the relative magnitudes of the effects that apply
to each of them is given by the following result.
13If we proceeded in this way, a full-fledged analysis of the situation should rely on the extended
framework considered in the online Appendix B, where full firm heterogeneity is allowed – in particular,
on input elasticities.
14We discuss this adjustment in more details in 7.1.2
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Proposition 8
Consider an initial production network with adjacency matrix G and suppose that node
i ∈ N = {1, 2, ..., n} is removed from it. Denote by
(
∆pi∗j
)
j 6=i
the change in equilibrium
profits of the remaining firms. Then,
∆pi∗j (G) = p˜ij(G)− pi∗j (G)− p˜ii(G)
mji(G)
mii(G)
, (18)
where p˜i(G) = (1− α− β)1−αβ w∗(I − αG)−1γ˜
Proof. See Appendix A.
The previous result indicates that the effect induced by the removal of a particular
firm i on the profits of the remaining firms j 6= i exhibits the usual pattern: a first-order
effect (that is quantified by the prominence/profitability of the firm directly affected, i.e.
firm i) composed with the effect that the directly affected firm has on the centrality of any
other firm (measured by the corresponding incentrality). In the present case, however,
the incentrality terms mji are “normalized” by the effect mii that firm i has on its own
centrality – in this sense, the relevant magnitude scales the outcentralities of i by the
extent to which this firm’s centrality effect feeds into itself. The additional effect, which
may have an opposite sign, is due to potential preference adjustments and is captured by
difference p˜ij(G)−pi∗j (G). Note that when there is no adjustment in consumer’s preferences
(when γ˜j = γj ∀j ∈ {1, 2, .., n} \ {i}) equation (18) becomes
∆pi∗j (G) = −pi∗i (G)
mji(G)
mii(G)
.
6 Forward and backward linkages
As explained in the Introduction, one of the useful features of the model is that it al-
lows a transparent formalization of the notions of forward and backward linkages (also
called push and pull effects) that, as stressed by (Hirschman, 1958), can be important
in assessing, for example, public interventions and economic policies. In essence, all of
the comparative static results considered so far in Subsections 4.1 through 5.3 can be
conceived as involving those two types of linkages, forward and backward. That is, the
overall effects considered so far can be seen to include a forward linkage that operates
downstream on the production structure, and a backwards one that works upstream.
Rather that revisiting all our previous results in this light, it will prove more useful
at this point to discuss these forces/linkages in the context of two particularly clear-cut
instances: a (Hicks-neutral) pattern of technological improvements on the production
technologies of the different firms; an arbitrary change in the preferences of the consumer
across the different goods. As we shall see, while the first case exerts only pure “push”
forces on the equilibrium outcome, the second one embodies an array of “pull” forces
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(some positive and others negative).
6.1 Technological change
Consider a change in the pre-factors (Ak)k∈N of the production functions of each firm k in
the economy (cf. (2)-(3)), which become (A˜k)k∈N . We shall refer to them as the produc-
tivities of the respective firms. The key observation to make from Proposition 2 is that
the equilibrium conditions imply that the induced sales at equilibrium are independent of
those productivities. This readily leads to the following two conclusions:
(i) The equilibrium input demands [(z∗jk)j 6=k]k∈N by each firm k (which are proportional
to sales) remain unaltered by the change in productivities. Thus, in this sense, there
are no pull effects operating upstream along the production structure.
(ii) The equilibrium prices of the goods enjoying higher productivities decrease propor-
tionally no less than their respective productivities rise. This in turn triggers a
downstream push over all sectors that use those goods directly or indirectly, with
lower prices all along inducing more output being produced.
Item (i) is quite clear and requires no further elaboration. It is worth mentioning, how-
ever, that for the same reason why input demands are unaffected by the change, profits
are unaffected as well. Productivity changes, therefore, have no effect on the inter-firm
distribution of profits. The reason why this happens is highlighted in Item (ii). In the
new equilibrium, price changes adapt to absorb all quantity effects (direct and indirect)
resulting from increased productivities. This, to be sure, is crucially dependent on our
Cobb-Douglas formulation, which implies that price changes exactly absorb all quantity
effects (direct and indirect) resulting from increased productivities. Admittedly, such a
consequence of the postulated functional form is quite extreme, but has the advantage of
highlighting the contrast between forward and backward linkages in a clear-cut manner.
A precise account of how these price-mediated effects propagate upstream is provided by
the following result.
Proposition 9
Consider a set of changes in firm productivities such that the new levels, (A˜i)i∈N , are
related to the former ones as follows:
A˜i = ξiAi (ξi > 0, i = 1, 2, ..., n). (19)
Under a suitable normalization, the corresponding equilibrium prices (p˜∗i )i∈N and (pi)
∗
i∈N ,
respectively prevailing before and after the change, satisfy:
− (log p˜∗i − log p∗i )ni=1 = −(I − αG′)−1 (log ξi)ni=1
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or
p˜∗i
p∗i
=
n∏
k=1
ξ−mkik (i = 1, 2, ..., n), (20)
where G′stands for the transpose of the adjacency matrix of the production network and,
for each firm i, (mki)k∈N is the vector of its outcentralities.
The key implication of the previous result is that, as explained in (ii), the inter-firm
linkages in this case are mediated through prices and quantities alone (i.e. not revenues
nor profits) and operate downstream. That is, the first-order effect of the change in the
productivity of any given firm k, as embodied by its corresponding ξk, propagates through
the outcentralities of this firm. Concerning prices, this effects is as described in (9). On
the other hand, in view of the constancy of equilibrium revenues, the corresponding effect
on quantities is simply given by
y˜∗i
y∗i
=
n∏
k=1
ξmkik (i = 1, 2, ..., n). (21)
6.2 Preference changes
Here we illustrate the nature of the backward linkages by focusing on a characteristic
example: changes in preferences, as captured by variations in the preference weight vector
γ – cf. (1). Recall that, as established by Proposition 2, equilibrium revenues and profits
are given by
s∗ = (s∗i )
n
i=1 ≡ (p∗i · y∗i )ni=1 =
w(1− α)
β
(I − αG)−1γ (i = 1, 2, ..., n),
and
pi∗ = (pi∗i )
n
i=1 = (1− α− β)s∗.
Thus both magnitudes, revenues and profits, are determined by linear functions of the
preference weights γ = (γi)i∈N . This readily leads to the following conclusion, which we
state formally for the sake of completeness.
Proposition 10
Suppose that the preference weights change from γ to γ˜, with
∑
j∈N ∆γi ≡
∑
j∈N γ˜i−γi =
0. Then, the induced change in equilibrium profits, (∆pi∗i )i∈N , satisfies:
∆pi∗i ∝
∑
j∈N
mij ∆γj (i = 1, 2, ..., n). (22)
Proof. Omitted
We find, therefore, that in contrast with the distribution-invariant forward linkages
induced by changes in firms’ productivities, any variation in preferences not only has
consequences on the allocation of resources but also distributional implications on firms’
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profits. Specifically, we have that the change in the profit of any given firm i is proportional
to a weighted average of the changes (positive or negative) experienced by the relative
importance that the consumer’s utility attributes to each consumption good. Naturally,
for each firm i, the weight that a particular consumption good j has in the computation
of such an average effect is given by the incentrality mij that captures the direct and
indirect impact of good j on the centrality of firm i. The overall effect on the whole set
of firms is purely redistributive, in the sense that the total profits are unaffected by the
changes in γ. The following corollary – which is an immediate consequence of the fact
that the matrix of incentralities M = (mij)ni,j=1 ≡ (I − αG)−1 is column stochastic –
states it explicitly.
Corollary 4
Under the conditions specified in Proposition 10, any change in the preference weights γ
induces a change in equilibrium profits, (∆pi∗i )i∈N , that satisfies Σi∈N∆pi
∗
i = 0.
7 Firm dynamics
To address in this section the issue of firm dynamics, we start by introducing in Subsection
7.1 a theoretical framework that extends the basic setup considered in Section 2 along
two complementary directions. First, we incorporate fixed labor costs. This has the main
effect of allowing for the possibility that, even at equilibrium, a firm may incur losses. If
this occurs, we assume it means that the firm in question becomes bankrupt and thus
may disappear. The second extension considers the case where the number of goods in
the economy may vary, thus leading to the possibility the size of the production network
may change.
In Subsection 7.2 we combine the two aforementioned extensions to provide a prelimi-
nary analysis of firm dynamics. More specifically, our discussion focuses on comparing the
welfare implications of alternative mechanisms governing the disappearance of firms when,
say, exogenous shocks may threaten their survival. The main insight we gather through
a simple illustrative exercise can be summarized as follows: if one relies on strict market-
based indicators (e.g. profits) instead of other network-based criteria, the consequences
from the viewpoint of long-run welfare can be quite detrimental.
7.1 A generalized framework: fixed costs and varying network size
7.1.1 Fixed costs
Suppose that, as long as any given firm i remains active, it has to pay some fixed cost
fi ≥ 0, which is interpreted as some given labor requirements that are independent on
the scale of production, This induces two different changes in our basic framework. First,
30
given the wage w, prices (pj)
n
j=1 for the intermediate inputs, and the production plan
[yi, li, (zji)
n
j=1)], the profit of firm i is given by
pii = piyi −
n∑
j=1
pjzji − w(li + fi).
Second, while the demand functions for labor and intermediate inputs do not change by
the introduction of fixed costs, the market-clearing condition for the labor market does
change since, in this case, the amount of labor available for production decreases with
the number of active firms. Specifically, the new market-clearing condition of the labor
market becomes: ∑
li = 1− F (23)
where F ≡∑ni=1 fi stands for the aggregate fixed cost across all firms.
The former modifications on the theoretical framework in turn induce some changes
on the equilibrium analysis of the economy. First, as a counterpart of original Proposition
2, we have the following generalization:
Proposition 11
There exists a unique WE for which the vector of equilibrium revenues s∗ = (s∗i )
n
i=1 ≡
(p∗i · y∗i )ni=1 is given by
s∗ =
w∗(1− F )(1− α)
β
(I − αG)−1γ (i = 1, 2, ..., n),
while the corresponding equilibrium profits are pi∗ = (pi∗i )
n
i=1 = (1−α−β)s∗−w∗f, where
f = (f1, f2, ..., fn)
′.
Proof. See Appendix A.
Arguably, in a market environment such as the one considered here, the profits earned
by a firm is one of the benchmarks we would like to contemplate in measuring its perfor-
mance. Then, quite naturally, the requirement that no negative profits (i.e. no losses) be
incurred by a firm arises as well as a natural benchmark to use in assessing its “viability.”
Under the simplifying assumption that all goods are consumption goods, the implications
of such a profit-based criterion are formally spelled out in the following straightforward
but useful corollary.
Corollary 5
In the context considered in Proposition 11, the individual firm profits obtained at the WE
satisfy:
pi∗i ≥ 0 ⇐⇒ vi ≡ (1− α)
n∑
j=1
mijγj ≥ β
1− α− β
fi
1− F (24)
where (mij)
n
j=1 is the ith row of the matrix of incentralities M (cf. (7)).
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Proof. Omitted
The above Corollary indicates the that, in order for a firm i to be viable, its network
(in-)centrality must be no lower than a certain given threshold, whose magnitude only
depends on technological/cost parameters, the size of the economy, and the fixed costs.
In Subsection 7.2, we compare this criterion with another one that relies as well on the
global architecture of the network but changes focus from how profitable a firm is to how
much it impinges on the profits of other firms – that is, from how central a firm is to
how it affects the centrality of others. This, in the end, boils down to shifting attention
from aggregate incentrality to normalized outcentrality, as suggested by Proposition 8.
Indeed, this is the approach also pursued in the present context by the following result,
which specifies the impact that the disappearance of any given firm has on the profits of
all others.
Proposition 12
Consider an initial production network with adjacency matrix G and suppose that node
i ∈ N = {1, 2, ..., n} is removed from it. Denote by
(
∆pi∗j
)
j 6=i
the change in equilibrium
profits of the remaining firms. Then,
∆pi∗j = p˜ij(G)− pi∗j (G)− p˜ii(G)
mji
mii
(j =, 1, 2, ..., n; j 6= i), (25)
where p˜i(G) = (1− α− β) (1−α)w∗(1−F+fi)β (I − αG)−1γ˜
Proof. See Appendix A.
An interesting observation that follows from the previous result is that, in contrast
with the case with no fixed costs, the removal of a firm i could now conceivably have a
positive influence on the profits of other firms j 6= i (and, conceivably, even lead to positive
overall effects). This occurs because the elimination of a firm relaxes the labor feasibility
constraint when there are fixed labor costs. The extent to which this is important for a
particular firm j depends on the scales at which firms i and j operated (or, equivalently,
their original profits), as well as on the the market pressure that the fixed costs fi were
previously imposing on the labor market.
7.1.2 Network size
Now we focus on the modeling issue of how to measure (consumer) welfare across situa-
tions where the network size changes due to variations in the number of firms active in
the economy. To this end, we need a formulation of preferences that is of course consis-
tent with our Cobb-Douglas specification (1) but is also able to accommodate a varying
number of consumption goods. A useful route to do so is provided by the so-called
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Ethier-Dixit-Stiglitz (EDS) preferences, which are represented by the utility function:
U˜(c ; ρ,N) =
∑
i∈N
cρi (26)
for some ρ > 0, where N is the whole universe of all possible goods (for simplicity,
all assumed to be valued by the consumer). An equivalent representation of the same
preferences is embodied by the monotone transformation of U˜(·) that induces a CES-
format counterpart given by:
Uˆ(c ; ρ,N) =
[∑
i∈N
cρi
] 1
ρ
.
Clearly, given any ρ, the above formulation can be adapted to any nonempty subset of
goods M ⊂ N by simply changing the set of goods under consideration. Moreover, as
it is well-known, the corresponding function Uˆ(· ; ρ,M) converges to the Cobb-Douglas
(CD) utility function (1) with equal weights γi =
1
m in the limit of ρ → 0. It is in this
sense that, for any given set M of consumption goods, we may view our CD formulation
as a representation of EDS preferences with an elasticity of substitution 11−ρ converging
to 1.
The former considerations indicate that one can suitably compare the welfare of the
consumer for different sets of goods being consumed, say M and M ′, by resorting to the
functions U˜(· ; ρ,M) and U˜(· ; ρ,M ′), defined respectively as direct generalizations of
(26). Then, again taking the limit on ρ for both of them, we arrive at the conclusion that
lim
ρ→0+
U˜(c(ρ) ; ρ,M) = |M | ≡ m; lim
ρ→0+
U˜(c′(ρ) ; ρ,M ′) = |M ′| ≡ m′ (27)
where c(ρ) ∈ Rm and c′(ρ) ∈ Rm′ stand for the pair of equilibrium consumption vectors
associated to ρ and, respectively, M and M ′. To understand (27), simply note that,
under (26), individual optimality requires that the equilibrium consumption of all goods
be positively bounded away from zero in ρ. Thus, in the end, we conclude that the welfare
comparison of two equilibrium allocations with different sets of available consumption
goods, M and M ′, comes down, in the Cobb-Douglas limit, to a comparison of their
respective cardinalities, m and m′. This will be, therefore, the welfare criterion used in
our ensuing discussion.
7.2 Firm dynamics: an illustrative example
We now rely on the formalization and results of the previous subsection to undertake a
preliminary exploration of firm dynamics. We focus, specifically, on the effects of alter-
native firm-selection criteria and, to fix ideas, consider the simple example with 6 firms
depicted in Figure 9.
To understand the role played by each node i in the network, a natural way to proceed
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Figure 9: Initial production network. It consists of 6 nodes, with firms {1, 2, 3} and
{4, 5, 6} defining two completely connected cliques.
it is to focus on its bilateral incentralities and outcentralities. On the one hand, we know
from Proposition 11 that, if the preference vector γ is symmetric, the equilibrium profit
of a firm i, is proportional to its aggregate incentrality mIi ≡
∑
j∈N mij (cf. (7)). This
magnitude, therefore, can be seen as a market-based measure of firm i’s own performance
at equilibrium. In contrast, the aggregate outcentrality mOi ≡
∑
j∈N mji is a measure
of how important is firm i for the aggregate (in-)centrality of all other firms. In fact,
Proposition 12 shows that if the latter magnitude is normalized by mii (i’s contribution
to its own centrality), the induced adjusted outcentrality, mˆOi ≡ 1mii
∑
j∈N mji, is an
important component in the aggregate effect of i’s removal on all other firms. This in
turn suggests that, in order to anticipate the final impact of the removal of any given firm
i, one should compare mIi and mˆ
O
i .
To apply these considerations to our example, in Figure 10 we depict the profiles[
mIi
]
i∈N and
[
mˆOi
]
i∈N across all 6 nodes in the production network being considered (for
expositional clarity we normalize the wage by setting w = 1). The key observation to make
is that there is an acute contrast between the incentralities and adjusted outcentralities
across nodes, with a polar behavior when one compares the sets {1, 2, 3} and {4, 5, 6}.
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Figure 10: Graphical representation of the incentrality profile and the profile of adjusted
outcentrality for the 6 firms of the economy, α = 0.9
In view of the aforementioned contrast, the question arises as to what criterion (in-
or out-centrality) should be used to evaluate the “systemic importance” of the different
firms in our example. This question, as posed, is probably too vague to be really useful.
Thus let us frame it in the following more concrete scenario, somewhat artificial but also
transparent and clear-cut. Suppose that a common temporary shock hits two firms, say
Firm 1 and 6, which in the absence of any outside support are sure to go bankrupt and
disappear from the economy. Further assume that the funds that may be used to provide
such a support are limited in that only one of the two firms can be helped. Which of the
two should it be?
To provide all necessary information, suppose that vector of fixed costs f satisfies
f1 = f6 = 10
−8 and f2 = f3 = f4 = f5 = 0.0235. Then, it can computed that the
equilibrium profit is given by pi∗ = (0.278, 0.255, 0.255, 9× 10−5, 9× 10−5, 0.092)′. Thus,
as our theory prescribes, the three first firms with the highest centralities earn the highest
profits, while the last three display the lowest profit levels.
Naturally, the answer to the question we have posed must depend on what is the
objective function to be optimized. In line with the discussion undertaken in Subsection
7.1.2, let us suppose that the final objective is to maintain the largest possible number
of active firms in the economy. Then, one possible criterion to determine what firm
should be saved from bankruptcy is given by profitability, i.e. what we have labeled the
“market-based measure of performance.” If one relies on this criterion, the scarce funds
should be used to help Firm 1 and hence it would be this firm that survives while Firm
6 would go under. However, once this has been carried out – interpreted as a once and
for all intervention – the market forces continue being at work and can therefore have a
further impact on the survival of the remaining firms. In fact, we find that Firms 4 and
5 now incur losses in the Walrasian Equilibrium (WE) of the smaller economy with the
set of active firms given by {1, 2, 3, 4, 5}, and hence those two firms should subsequently
exit the market. Thereafter, all the firms in the remaining set {1, 2, 3} avoid losses at
the corresponding WE and hence the situation may remain stationary in the absence of
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any further interference or a subsequent entry of new firms. This process is graphically
illustrated in Figure 11.
(a) (b) (c)
1
π1*=0.28
2
π2*=0.26
3π3*=0.26
4π4*=9×10-5 5π5*=9×10-5
6
π6*=0.09
1
π1*=0.29
2
π2*=0.26
3π3*=0.26
4π4*=-1×10-4
5
π5*=-1×10-4 1π1*=0.32
2
π2*=0.29
3π3*=0.29
Figure 11: The firm dynamics triggered by the initial elimination of Firm 6 (a), followed
by the consecutive step (b) where Firms 4 and 5 incur losses (i.e. obtain negative profits)
and are eliminated. In the resulting network (c) all firms make positive net profit
Alternatively, the criterion for selecting the firm to be supported may single out the
firm that, if it were to disappear, would have the highest effect on the profit performance
of other firms. Then, quantifying such an effect by the adjusted (aggregate) outcentrality,
the support to buffer the shock should be enjoyed by Firm 6 rather than Firm 1. Of
course, once this choice is implemented, the immediate consequence is that Firm 1 exits
the system. The adjustment process ends there. For, in the resulting situation, where the
other five firms are still active, all of these enjoy positive profits at the induced Walrasian
Equilibrium. This process is graphically illustrated in Figure 12. The system, therefore,
reaches a stationary state that dominates (in the sense explained in Subsection 7.1.2)
the alternative state that would have been reached by the alternative selection criterion
based on firm profitability. This contrast illustrates in a stark manner what has been
the leading theme of this paper, namely, that a networked production economy cannot
be properly understood, nor suitable policies implemented, unless one adopts a genuine
network viewpoint.
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(a) (b)
1
π1*=0.28
2
π2*=0.26
3π3*=0.26
4π4*=9×10-5 5π5*=9×10-5
6
π6*=0.09
2
π2*=0.4
3
π3*=0.38
4π4*=0.009
5π5*=0.009
6
π6*=0.033
Figure 12: The elimination of Firm 1 (a) does not cause thereafter the exit of any other
firm from the network.
8 Summary and conclusions
In this paper, we have studied a general equilibrium model of an economy that focuses
primarily on the inter-firm network of input-output relationships that underlie its produc-
tion structure. Is this modeling approach useful to understand economic performance?
A first, and particularly sharp, illustration of its usefulness derives from the connection
we have identified between market equilibrium outcomes and an intuitive measure of cen-
trality that combines topological and preference information. Specifically, we have shown
that, at equilibrium, the profits of the different firms are directly proportional to their
corresponding centralities.
The paper has then turned to extending this approach into the investigation of a
number of important comparative-statics questions:
(a) the effects of distortions (local or global);
(b) the implications of alternative network changes (on nodes or links);
(c) the impact of non-network “fundamentals” (preferences or productivities).
While the specifics of each of these cases is quite different, the conclusions obtained
exhibit a common format. The overall effect always obtains from a composition of a
first-order impact on the firms directly affected and a diffusion of this impact throughout
the economy as determined by the matrix of cross-firm inter-centralities. A different,
but complementary, perspective is gained if we decompose matters into the effects that
spread upstream along the network (backward linkages) and those that do it downstream
(forward linkages). This alternative perspective has been found useful, for example, when
comparing the changes that affect productivities and those that impinge on preferences.
Finally, we have turned to studying the dynamic consequences of incorporating net-
work considerations into the evaluation of simple policy dilemmas – in particular, we have
compared the implications of alternative criteria for firm support in the face of exogenous
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shocks that threaten firm survival. Relying on a simple example, we have illustrated the
point that tailoring those supporting decisions only to current market-based information
(thus ignoring forward-looking network-based considerations) may be quite misleading
and lead to disappointing results. For example, the number of firms eventually affected
by the shock may be much larger than would have been optimal.
Clearly, the model proposed in this paper is quite stylized and hence leaves ample
room for extensions. Interesting possibilities would be to allow for less stringent assump-
tions on the competitive behavior of agents, or generalize the Cobb-Douglas formulation
of preferences and technologies posited here. In fact, a theoretical framework with the
aforementioned features has been formulated in the paper by Baqaee (2015) already men-
tioned in the Introduction. Specifically, that paper considers a context where the set of
firms are involved in monopolistic competition, and both preferences and technologies are
of the CES type. (On the other hand, it also allows for adjustments in the extensive
margin, through the endogenous entry and exit of firms.) Baqaee’s concern, however, is
similar to that of Acemoglu et al. (2012) and thus focuses his analysis on how microeco-
nomic shocks aggregate at the level of the whole economy. An extension of our analysis
to the richer scenario studied in Baqaee (2015) would be very interesting indeed, and is
one of our objectives for future research.
More generally, a primary objective for follow-up research should be to apply our
network-based approach to inform and shape a variety of measures of economic policy.
But to this end, of course, a thorough empirical testing of the model must be conducted
first. This, in turn, requires the use of data that are rich and granular enough at the
microeconomic level to account for the intricate pattern of inter-firm interactions that
characterize a modern economy. Fortunately, these data are now becoming available, as
well as the tools (theoretical, algorithmic, and computational) needed to analyze them.
As a case in point, we refer to the work in progress that we are currently undertaking
with panel data from the Spanish Tax Agency. The data include essentially all bilateral
transactions among Spanish firms (and many other economically relevant entities, public
or private) during the decade 2004-2013. The analysis conducted so far, still preliminary,
has delivered promising results. In particular, we have found a very strong and significant
relationship between the profitability of firms and their respective centrality, which is one
of the basic predictions of our model (cf. Proposition 2). Subsequent research will test
some of its other predictions.
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Appendix A: Proofs of the main results
We start this Appendix by providing a formal definition of Walrasian Equilibrium. Then
we proceed by providing detailed proofs of the results in the papeper.
Definition 2 (Walrasian Equilibrium)
A WE is an array [(p∗, w∗), (c∗,y∗,Z∗, l∗)] that satisfies the following conditions:
1. The representative consumer chooses c∗ by solving:
max
c
∏
i inM
cγi
s.t.
∑
i∈M
pici = w +
n∑
k=1
pik.
2. Firms choose y∗,Z∗, l∗ by solving:
max
(zji)j ,li
piyi −
∑
j∈r+i
pjzjigji − wli
s.t. zi = Ail
β
i
 ∏
j∈N+i
z
gji
ji
α .
3. Markets for labour and intermediate goods clear:
yi =
∑
j
zij + ci ∀(i ∈ N)∑
i
li = 1.
Proof of Proposition 1: The production function (2) implies that in order to be active
a firm has to have at least one active in-neighbour (see footnote 4). Consider an upstream
walk from i choosing only active firms. As number of firms is finite and each active firm
must have at least one active in-neighbor, this means that there must exist an upstream
walk from i that visits the same active node more than once. This proves part (a).
To prove part (b), note that, in the end, the demand for produced goods in the model
is generated by the consumer. Thus if there is no path from a firm to the consumer then
the total demand for that good will be zero, and therefore that firm will choose not to
produce.
Proof of Corollary 1. Fallows directly from Proposition 1
Proof of Proposition 2. To simplify notation, throughout the proofs in the Appendices
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we shall dispense with the asterisk to identify equilibrium magnitudes. The context should
make clear when we refer to equilibrium values.
The first order conditions for the maximization problem of firm i with respect to zji
are given by
Aipiαgjil
β
i z
αgji−1
ji
∏
k,k 6=j
zαgkiki = pj ⇒ zji =
piαgji
pj
yi (j = 1, 2, ..., n), (28)
and with respect to labor li:
Aipiβl
β−1
i
∏
k
zαgkiki = w ⇒ li =
piβ
w
yi. (29)
Using (28) and (29) we may write the profit of firm i as follows:
pii = piyi −
∑
j
(
pj
piαgji
pj
yi
)
− wpiβ
w
yi = (1− α− β)piyi. (30)
Next, from the clearing condition for the labor market and (29), we find that w =
β
∑
i piyi, which together with (30) and the FOC for the consumer gives rise to:
ci =
∑n
j=1(1− α− β)pjyj + w
pi
γi =
(1− α)w
βpi
γi. (31)
Then, if (28) and (31) are inserted into the market clearing condition for good i, this
condition can be written in the following manner:
si =
(1− α)w
βm
γi + α
∑
j
gijsj (32)
where si ≡ piyi is the revenue of firm i. In vector notation, we may write compactly the
system of market clearing conditions for all intermediate goods as follows:
s =
(1− α)w
β
γ + αGs (33)
which, as the matrix G is column-stochastic and α < 1, has the unique solution:
s =
(1− α)w
β
(I − αG)−1 γ. (34)
Finally, also note that (30) directly implies that equilibrium profits satisfy pi = (1−α−β)s.
This completes the proof.
Proof of Corollary 2. Suppose that all goods are consumed and define:
v ≡ β
w
s = (1− α)(I − αG)−1γ. (35)
Expanding (35) we can write v = (1 − α) (∑∞k=0 αkGk)γ. This sum converges since
0 ≤ α < 1 and G is column-stochastic. The latter also implies that 1′Gγ = 1, as∑n
i=1 γi = 1. Given that the product of two stochastic matrices is stochastic, the same
conclusion applies if instead of G we consider Gk for any k ∈ N , i.e. we also have
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1′Gkγ = 1. This then implies:
1′v = (1− α)
∞∑
k=0
αk =
1− α
1− α = 1. (36)
From the previous expression, together with (29) and the labor-market clearing condition,
it directly follows that vj =
sj∑n
i=1 si
. Thus, recalling that pii = (1− α− β)si, the proof is
complete.
Proof of Proposition 3. To calculate the utility of the consumer we proceed as follows.
Inserting (28) and (29) into the production function (2), we have:
yi = Ai
(
piβ
w
yi
)β∏
j
(
piαgji
pj
yi
)αgji
⇒
∏
j∈N+i
(
p
αgji
j
)
yi = Ai
(
piβ
w
yi
)β∏
j
(piαgjiyi)
αgji ⇒
∏
j∈N+i p
αgji
j
pi
si = Ai
(
β
w
si
)β∏
j
(αgjisi)
αgji .
Then, taking natural logs we get that:
α
∑
j∈Ni
gji log pj − log pi = (37)
logAi + β log β − (1− α− β) log si − β logw + α logα+ α
∑
j
gji log gji (i = 1, 2, ..., n)
Let us define u ≡ α logα+ β log β + (1−α− β) log β and write the system (37) in vector
notation as follows:
α
(
I − αG′) log p = (1− α)1 logw − (α+ ν) logn+ (1− α− β) log v − αH ′1− u1 (38)
where we have used (3) and (35) to expand Ai and si respectively. Then, premultiplying
(38) with v′ = (1− α)γ ′(I − αG′)−1 and normalizing ∑i log pi = 0 we get (39)
(1− α) logw = (α+ ν)
∑
i
vi log ni − (1− α− β)
∑
i
vi log vi + α
∑
i
∑
j
vigji log gji + u,
(39)
Recall now that ci =
(1−α)w
βpi
γi. So we can write the utility function of the representa-
tive consumer as follows:
U(c) =
n∏
i=1
(
(1− α)w
βpi
γi
)γi
=
n∏
i=1
γγii
1− α
β
w.
Substituting w from (39) we can express logarithm of the utility function with the follow-
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ing equation.
logU(c) =
n∑
i=1
γi log γi + log(1− α)α
α
1−α +
1
1− α(ν + α)∑
i
vi log ni − (1− α− β)
∑
i∈N
vi log vi + α
∑
i∈N
∑
j∈N+i
vigji log gji

Proof of Corollary 3. In the symmetric case gji = gki = 1/ni ∀(j, k ∈ N+i ) and
γi =
1
n ∀i. Hence, we have that
∑
i
∑
j vigji log gji =
∑
i vi log
1
ni
= −∑i vi log ni, and∑n
i=1 γi log γi = − log n , which together with Proposition 3 gives:
logU(c) = −logn+ log (1− α)α α1−α + 1
1− α
(
ν
n∑
i=1
vi log ni − (1− α− β)
n∑
i=1
vi log vi
)
.
Now, for the sake of completeness, we extend the definition of WE to a context with
distortions, as studied in Section 4.
Definition 3 (WE with distortions)
For an exogeneus vector of price distortions τ = (τi)
n
i=1. A WE is an array [(p
∗, w∗), (c∗,y∗,Z∗, l∗)]
such that:
1. The representative consumer chooses c∗ to solve:
max
c
∏
i inM
cγi
s.t.
∑
i∈M
pici = w +
n∑
k=1
pik.
2. Firms choose y∗,Z∗, l∗ to solve:
max
(zji)j ,li
(1− τi)piyi −
∑
j∈r+i
pjzjigji − wli
s.t. zi = Ail
β
i
 ∏
j∈N+i
z
gji
ji
α .
3. Markets for labor and intermediate goods clear:
y∗i =
∑
j
z∗ij + c
∗
i (i = 1, 2, ..., n)∑
i
li = 1.
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Next, we state and prove two separate Lemmas that establish corresponding claims
made in Section 4.
Lemma 1
There exists a unique WE with uniform price distortions as long as (1 − τ)α < 1. The
vector of equilibrium revenues s∗(τ) = (s∗i (τ))
n
i=1 ≡ (p∗i · y∗i )ni=1 is given by
s∗(τ) =
w∗(1− α)
β
(I − α(1− τ)G)−1γ (i = 1, 2, ..., n),
while the corresponding equilibrium profits pi∗(τ) = (pi∗i )
n
i=1 = (1− τ)(1− α− β)s∗(τ).
Proof of Lemma 1: The proof is analogous to that of Proposition 2. In the case of a
uniform price distortion τ , the former equations (28) and (29) become:
zji = (1− τ)piαgji
pj
yi
li = (1− τ)piβ
w
yi
for each i, j = 1, 2, ..., n. Therefore, proceeding as before, it readily follows that the vector
of equilibrium revenues satisfies
s(τ) =
(1− α)w
β
(I − α(1− τ)G)−1 γ
and, correspondingly, the equilibrium profit of each firm i is given by:
pii(τ) = (1−τ)piyi(τ)−
∑
j∈N+i
pj(1−τ)piαgji
pj
yi(τ)−w(1−τ)piβ
w
yi(τ) = (1−τ)(1−α−β)si(τ)
or in vectorial form:
pi(τ) = (1− τ)(1− α− β)s(τ) (40)
Finally, the uniqueness of equilibrium follows simply from the fact that G is column-
stochastic and (1− τ)α < 1. This completes the proof.
Lemma 2
In the WE with uniform price distortion τ the following holds:
dpi∗
dτ
(τ) < 0
Proof of Lemma 2: Recall that equilibrium revenues satisfy s(τ) = 1−αβ γ + α(1 −
τ)Gs(τ). Thus, differentiating both sides with respect to τ , we get:
ds
dτ
(τ) = −αGs(τ) + α(1− τ)Gds
dτ
(τ)⇒ ds
dτ
(τ)− α(I − α(1− τ)G)−1Gs(τ) (41)
From (40) and (41), it easily follows that:
dpi
dτ
(τ) = −(1− α− β)s(τ)− α(1− τ)(1− α− β)(I − α(1− τ)G)−1Gs(τ)
= −(1− α− β)s(τ)− α(I − α(1− τ)G)−1Gpi(τ) < 0.
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Proof of Proposition 4: Recall, from (40), that
pi(τ) = (1− τ)(1− α− β)s(τ) = (1− τ)(1− α− β)1− α
β
w (I − α(1− τ)G)−1 γ (42)
Thus, setting w = 1−(1−τ)α(1−τ)(1−α)(1−α−β)β, the induced profits are normalized such that the
sum of profits across nodes is equal to 1. We can now write the normalized equilibrium
profit vector as (43).
pˆi(τ) = (1− α(1− τ))γ + α(1− τ)Gpˆi(τ) (43)
Taking the derivative of (43) with respect to τ we obtain:
dpˆi
dτ
(τ) = αγ − αGpˆi(τ) + α(1− τ)Gdpˆi
dτ
(τ),
and then an explicit expression for dpˆidτ (τ)
dpˆi
dτ
(τ) = α(I − α(1− τ)G)−1(γ −Gpˆi(τ)) (44)
Equation (44) can be developed as follows:
dpˆi
dτ
(τ) = α(I − α(1− τ)G)−1γ − 1
1− τ
(
(I − α(1− τ)G)−1pˆi(τ)− (1− α(1− τ)(I − α(1− τ)G)−1γ)
=
α
1− α(1− τ) pˆi(τ)−
1
1− τ
(
(I − α(1− τ)G)−1pˆi(τ)− pˆi(τ))
=
1
1− τ
(
1
1− α(1− τ) pˆi(τ)− (I − α(1− τ)G)
−1pˆi(τ)
)
=
1
1− τ (I − α(1− τ)G)
−1 (γ − pˆi(τ))
For a particular firm i we have:
dpˆii
dτ
(τ) =
1
1− τ
n∑
j=1
m˜ij(τ) (γj − pˆij(τ)) (45)
If all goods are symmetric consumption goods, (45) becomes:
dpˆii
dτ
(τ) =
1
1− τ
n∑
j=1
m˜ij(τ)
(
1
n
− pˆij(τ)
)
so that, when evaluated at τ = 0, we find:
dpˆii
dτ
∣∣∣∣
τ=0
=
n∑
j=1
mij (γj − pˆij(0))
as desired, thus completing the proof.
Lemma 3
Let G be a n-dimensional matrix, and α ∈ R such that there exist (I − αG)−1. Then:
(I − αG)−1G = 1α
(
(I − αG)−1 − I)
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Proof of Lemma 3: (I−αG)−1G = (∑∞k=0 αkGk)G = ∑∞k=0 αkGk+1 = 1α∑∞k=0 αk+1Gk+1 =
1
α
∑∞
k=1 α
kGk = 1α
(∑∞
k=0 α
kGk − α0G0) = 1α ((I − αG)−1 − I)
Proof of Proposition 5: Proceeding in a way analogous to that pursued for a uniform
price distortion, we arrive to the following expression for the revenue vector at equilibrium.
s(τk) =
1− α
β
w
(
I − (αG− ατkgke′k)
)−1
γ
Using Sherman-Morrison formula we get (46).
s(τk) =
1− α
β
w
(
(I − αG)−1γ − (I − αG)
−1ατkgke′k(I − αG)−1
1 + ατke
′
k(I − αG)−1gk
γ
)
(46)
Note first that 1−αβ w(I − αG)−1γ = s(0) and (1−α)wβ (I − αG)−1ατkgke
′
k(I − αG)−1γ =
−ατksk(0)(I − αG)−1gk. Using this to simplify (46) we get:
s(τk) = s(0)− sk(0) ατk(I − αG)
−1gk
1 + ατke
′
k(I − αG)−1gk
= s(0)− sk(0)τk((I − αG)
−1 − I)ek
1− τk + τkmkk (47)
where the last equality follows directly from Lemma 3 in Appendix D. For a specific firm
i 6= k we have pii(τk) = (1− α− β)
(
si(0)− sk(0) τkmki1−τ+τmkk
)
, and hence
dpii
dτk
(τk) = −(1− α− β)sk(0) mki
(1− τk(1−mkk))2
On the other hand, for Firm k, pik(τk) = (1− τk)(1− α− β)
(
sk(0)− sk(0) τk(mkk−1)1−τ+τmkk
)
=
(1− τk)(1− α− β)sk(0) 1−τk1−τk+τkmkk , and therefore
dpik
dτk
(τk) = −(1− α− β)sk(0) mkk
(1− τk(1−mkk))2
It is then obvious that
dpii(τk)
dτk
∣∣∣∣
τk=0
= −pik(0)mki (i = 1, 2, ..., n),
which completes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 6: For a fixed n = |N |, let us find the network topology that
maximizes expression (6). In order to do that it is useful to define Φ : Rn×Rn → R with
Φ(v,n) =
∑n
i=1 vi log ni. Let us also define function Ψ : R→ R as:
Ψ(y¯) = max
(xi)ni=1,(yi)
n
i=1
n∑
i=1
xilogyi
s.t.
n∑
i=1
yi = y¯
n∑
i=1
xi = 1
yi ≤ n− 1 ∧ yi ≥ 1 ∧ xi > 0, i = 1, ..., n
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One can easily show that function Ψ is strictly increasing in y¯. For any graph with nˆ
nodes and Lˆ links (
∑
i nˆi = Lˆ) it is clear that Φ(vˆi, nˆi) ≤ Ψ(Lˆ) < Ψ(n(n− 1)). Note that
for complete network ∀(i, j ∈ N)(ni = nj)⇒ Φ(vvi , nci ) = Ψ(n(n− 1)) (since Ψ is strictly
increasing). Thus, the complete network is the unique maximizer of Φ.
The value of expression −∑ni vi log vi which is in fact the entropy measure of simplex
vector v will be maximized when vi = vj ∀(i, j ∈ N), which will incidentally be true in
the case of the complete network and the ring network. It fallows now that utility will
be maximized at the complete network when ν > 0 and that the complete network will
be the unique network that maximizes the consumer’s utility. It is easy to see that when
ν < 0 a network in which all nodes have the same centrality v and the same in-degree
(equal to 1) will maximize (6), as for such a network the entropy of centrality vector
will be maximized and η
∑n
i=1 vi log ni = 0. This will, for instance, be the case when
the production network is the ring network. When ν = 0, then any network such that
centrality of each node is equal will maximize social welfare.
Proof of Proposition 7: Using Sherman-Morrison formula we write:
s˜ =
1− α
β
w(I − αG˜)−1γ = 1− α
β
w(I − αG− αqe′i)−1γ
=
1− α
β
w
(
(I − αG)−1γ + (I − αG)
−1αqe′i(I − αG)−1
1− αe′i(I − αG)−1q
γ
)
(48)
Proceeding analogue to the analysis in Proposition 5, we get that the effect of adding a
link (i, j) on the centrality of firm k is:
s˜k − sk = αsj
qimki +
∑
l∈N+j qlmkl
1 + qimji + α
∑
l∈N+j qlmjl
.
where s˜k is the revenue of k after adding link (i, j). Since, as we have shown before,
pi = (1− α− β)s this completes the proof.
The fallowing important lemma is proven by (Ballester et al., 2006)
Lemma 4 (BZC)
mji(G)mik(G) = mii(G)(mjk(G)−mjk(G−i))
Proof of Lemma 4:
mii(G)(mjk(G)−mjk(G−i)) =
∞∑
p=1
αp
∑
r+s=p
r≥0,s≥1
g
[r]
ji (g
[s]
jk − g[s]j(−i)k) =
∞∑
p=1
αp
∑
r+s=p
r≥0,s≥2
g
[r]
ii g
[s]
j(i)k
=
∞∑
p=1
αp
∑
r′+s′=p
r′≥1,s′≥1
g
[r′]
ji g
[s′]
ik = mji(G)mik(G)
where G−i is the resulting network after elimination of node i from network G.
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Proof of Proposition 8: We can write the profit of firm j after elimination of node i
from the network as
pij(G˜) = (1− α− β)1− α
β
w
n∑
k=1
k 6=i
mjk(G˜)γk
= (1− α− β) 1− α
mii(G)β
w
n∑
k=1
(mii(G)mjk(G)−mji(G)mik(G)) γ˜k.
where the second line follows directly from Lemma 4. Furthermore:
pij(G˜)− pij(G) =
(1− α− β)1− α
β
w
(
1
mii(G)
n∑
k=1
(mii(G)mjk(G)−mji(G)mik(G))γ˜k −
n∑
k=1
mjk(G)γk
)
=
(1− α− β)1− α
β
w
(
n∑
k=1
mjk(G)(γ˜k − γk)− mji(G)
mii(G)
n∑
k=1
mik(G)γ˜k
)
=
p˜ij(G)− pij(G)− p˜ii(G)mji(G)
mii(G)
Proof of Proposition 9: From (37) by normalizing: α logα+β log β−β logw = 0 and
by writing bi ≡ −(1− α− β) log si + α
∑n
j=1 gji log gji we get:
log p = (I − αG′)−1 (logA+ b)
Consider the technology shock that changes Ai to A˜i ≡ ξiAi (we shall use ˜ to denote
the variables after the technology shock). It is clear that this shock will not affect the
relative demand of goods in the equilibrium which implies that (33) will not be affected
by the technology shock. So, si = s˜i ⇒ bi = b˜i. From here it directly follows:
log p˜− log p = (I − αG′)−1
(
log A˜− logA
)
= (I − αG′)−1 log ξ
Where we have used the following notation: logx ≡ (log xi)ni=1.
Proof of Proposition 11: Proceeding analogously to Proposition 2 one can see that
the profit of a firm in the equilibrium will be given pii = (1 − α − β)si − wfi. Using
this and the market clearing condition for labor (23) we get that the total income of the
consumer is: Y = w +
∑n
i=1 pii = w + (1 − α − β)
∑n
i=1 si −
∑n
i=1wfi = (1 − α)1−Fβ w.
Then, the revenue vector in the equilibrium is defined with:
s =
(1− α)(1− F )
β
wγ + αGs⇒ s = (1− α)(1− F )
β
w(I − αG)−1γ
and the corresponding vector of equilibrium profits is pi = (1− α− β)s− wf
Proof to the Corollary 5: Directly follows from the Proposition 11 and (35).
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Proof of Proposition 12: We can write the profit of firm j after i is eliminated from
the network as:
pij(G˜) = (1− α− β)(1− α)(1− F + fi)
β
n∑
k=1
k 6=i
mjk(G˜)γk
= (1− α− β)(1− α)(1− F + fi)
mii(G)β
w
n∑
k=1
(mii(G)mjk(G)−mji(G)mik(G)) γ˜k.
where the second line follows directly from Lemma 4. Furthermore:
pij(G˜)− pij(G) =
(1− α− β)(1− α)(1− F + fi)
β
w(
1
mii(G)
n∑
k=1
(mii(G)mjk(G)−mji(G)mik(G))γ˜k − 1− F
1− F + fi
n∑
k=1
mjk(G)γk
)
=
(1− α− β)(1− α)(1− F + fi)
β
w
(
n∑
k=1
mjk(G)
(
γ˜k − 1− F
1− F + fiγk
)
− mji(G)
mii(G)
n∑
k=1
mik(G)γ˜k
)
=
p˜ij(G)− pij(G)− p˜ii(G)mji(G)
mii(G)
Appendix B (Online): General framework: model with full
inter-firm heterogeneity
Here we present a more general version of our model, and show that relation between
centrality and profit will still hold. In this version of the model we still require for
production function to be Cobb-Douglas, but we allow general heterogeneity with respect
to parameters of the production function (α, β, A). Recall that before we have already
allowed for heterogeneity in link weights (gij)
n
i=1,j=1 and in preference weights (γi)
n
i=1.
We write the production function as: yi = Ail
βi
i
(∏
j∈Ni z
gji
ji
)αi
with constraint that
αi + βi ≤ 1. The utility function also takes a general form: U(c) =
∏n
i=1 c
γi
i , with
γi ≥ 0 ∀i ∈ N and
∑n
i=1 γi = 1. Optimizing, we get that the firm j’s demand for
intermediate inputs and labor are
zij =
pjαjgij
pi
yj
lj =
pjβj
w
yj .
The consumer’s demand for consumption good i is
ci = γi
∑n
j=1 pij + w
pi
= γi
w +
∑n
j=1(1− αj − βj)pjyj
pi
.
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The market clearing condition for good i can be written as (49)
si = γiw + γi
n∑
j=1
(1− αj − βj)sj +
n∑
j=1
αjgijsj (49)
Before proceeding any further, let us introduce the following notation:
ξ :=

1− α1 − β1
1− α2 − β2
...
1− αn − βn
 and ℵ ≡

α1 0 . . . 0
0 α2 . . . 0
...
...
. . .
...
0 0 . . . αn
.
Using the above introduced notation we write (49) for every firm i (in matrix notation)
as:
s = wγ + γξ′s+Gℵs,
which implies (50)
s = w(I − γξ′ −Gℵ)−1γ (50)
The equation (50) relates the revenue of the firm i with it’s centrality in the network which
adjacency matrix is: γξ′−Gℵ. Let us show that inverse matrix in (50) exists. Note that
the sum of column i of matrix γξ′ is (1− αi − βi)
∑n
j=1 γj = (1− αi − βi) < 1. The sum
of column i of matrix Gℵ is ∑k = gkiαi = αi < 1. Then the sum of column i of matrix
γξ′ +Gℵ is 0 < 1− βi < 1. Furthermore, it is clear that all elements of matrix γξ′ +Gℵ
are positive. Thus, matrix γξ′+Gℵ is a sub-matrix of a column stochastic matrix. From
Perron-Frobenius theorem we know that the spectral radius of matrix γξ′+Gℵ is smaller
than 1. This implies that I−γξ′−Gℵ is invertible (as (I−γξ′−Gℵ)−1 = ∑∞i=0 (γξ′ +Gℵ)i
converges). As before, it is easy to see that pii = (1− αi − βi)si
Appendix C (Online): Distortions with balance conditions
We provide the basic results from Section 4 for the case when the payements of firms are
redistributed to final consumers.
Uniform price distortion
In this case the consumer’s income is given by (51), as now the consumer receives the
collected tax from firms.
Y = (1− τ)(1− α− β)
∑
i∈N
piyi + (1− τ)
∑
i∈N
βpiyi + τ
∑
i∈N
piyi =
w(1− (1− τ)α)
β(1− τ) (51)
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From (51) it directly follows that the consumer’s demand in the equilibrium must satisfy:
ci =
Y
pi
γi =
w(1− α(1− τ))
piβ(1− τ) γi
From here it is easy to see that equation (33) in this case becomes:
s(τ) =
w(1− α(1− τ))
β(1− τ) γ + α(1− τ)Gs⇒
s(τ) =
w(1− α(1− τ))
β(1− τ) (I − α(1− τ)G)
−1 γ
The positive effect of the transfer to the consumer is relative to result in Lemma 1 is
captured by change of wage scaling factor from (1−α)β to
(1−α(1−τ))
β(1−τ) >
(1−α)
β . However,
it is not difficult to see that with this formulation the comparative static results from
Subsection 4.1 will (qualitatively) still hold.
Individual price distortion
Suppose firm k is affected by the distortion. The income of the consumer in this case can
be written as:
Y =
∑
i∈N
(1− α− β) piyi − τ (1− α− β) pkyk + β
∑
i∈N
piyi − τβpkyk + τpkyk
=
1− α
β
w + τpkyk.
And the centrality equation becomes:
s(τ) =
(
1− α
β
w + τsk(τ)
)
γ + α(G+Q(τ))s(τ) =
1− α
β
wγ + α(G+Q(τ) + V (τ))s(τ)
where:
Q(τ) ≡

0 . . . −g1kτ . . . 0
0 . . . −g2kτ . . . 0
...
. . .
...
. . .
...
0 . . . −gnkτ . . . 0
 V (τ) ≡

0 . . . γ1
τ
α . . . 0
0 . . . γ2
τ
α . . . 0
...
. . .
...
. . .
...
0 . . . γn
τ
α . . . 0

Let us define W (τ) ≡ V (τ) + Q(τ). The matrix W (τ) is nxn matrix with non-zero
elements only in k − th column, and with (i, k) element equal to τα(γi − αgik). Let us
denote with x = x(τ) a column vector with elements equal to τα(γi − αgik). So we can
write W (τ) = xe′k and s(τ) =
(1−α)w
β (I−(αG+αxe′k))−1γ. Using the Sherman-Morrison
formula we get (52).
s(τ) =
(1− α)w
β
(
(I − αG)−1γ + (I − αG)
−1αxe′k(I − αG)−1
1− αe′k(I − αG)−1x
γ
)
(52)
Recall now that (1−α)wβ (I − αG)−1γ = s(0). Furthermore,
(1− α)w
β
(I − αG)−1αxe′k(I − αG)−1γ = sk(0)
(
τ
β
w(1− α)s(0)− τ(I − αG)
−1 − I)ek
)
.
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On the other hand, the denominator of (52) becomes:
1− αek′(I − αG)−1x =
1− (τe′k(I − αG)−1γ − τe′k((I − αG)−1 − I)ek) =
1− τ
(
β
(1− α)wsk(0)−mkk + 1
)
.
So we can finally write:
s(τ) = s(0) +
sk(0)
1− τ
(
β
(1−α)wsk(0)−mkk + 1
) (τ β
w(1− α)s(0)− τ(I − αG)
−1 − I)ek
)
.
which for a firm i becomes (53)
si(τ) = si(0) +
sk(0)
1− τ
(
β
(1−α)wsk(0)−mkk + 1
) (τ β
w(1− α)si(0)− τmki
)
(53)
The positive effect of the transfer to the consumer in (53) relative to what we had in
Proposition 5 is captured by the expression in the numerator sk(0)
(
τ βw(1−α)si(0)
)
which
reflects the increase in centrality of firm i as demand for good i increases due to the income
effect (the consumer receives additional income as the ’tax’ is transferred to him). As in
(47) this effect is discounted with properly adjusted expression that captures how much
distorted firm contributes to it’s own centrality. To conclude, the transfer will mild down
detrimental consequences of the (negative) distortion, but including it into the model will
not bring much more insights in the questions we are studying in the paper.
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